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<title>Mind–body problem</title>

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<span id="openzim-page-title" class="mw-page-title-main"><span class="mw-page-title-main">Mind–body problem</span></span>

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<p>The <b>mind–body problem</b> is a <a href="List_of_philosophical_problems#Mind–body_problem" title="List of philosophical problems">philosophical problem</a> concerning the relationship between <a href="Thought" title="Thought">thought</a> and <a href="Consciousness" title="Consciousness">consciousness</a> in the human <a href="Mind" title="Mind">mind</a> and <a href="Human_body" title="Human body">body</a>.<sup id="cite_ref-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-1"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>1<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-Georgiev2020_2-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Georgiev2020-2"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>2<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> It addresses the nature of consciousness, mental states, and their relation to the physical <a href="Brain" title="Brain">brain</a> and <a href="Nervous_system" title="Nervous system">nervous system</a>. The problem centers on understanding how immaterial thoughts and feelings can interact with the material world, or whether they are ultimately physical phenomena.

</p><p>This problem has been a central issue in <a href="Philosophy_of_mind" title="Philosophy of mind">philosophy of mind</a> since the 17th century, particularly following René Descartes' formulation of <a href="Mind%E2%80%93body_dualism" title="Mind–body dualism">dualism</a>, which proposes that mind and body are fundamentally distinct substances. Other major philosophical positions include <a href="Monism" title="Monism">monism</a>, which encompasses <a href="Physicalism" title="Physicalism">physicalism</a> (everything is ultimately physical) and <a href="Idealism" title="Idealism">idealism</a> (everything is ultimately mental). More recent approaches include <a href="Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind)" title="Functionalism (philosophy of mind)">functionalism</a>, <a href="Property_dualism" title="Property dualism">property dualism</a>, and various non-reductive theories.

</p><p>The mind-body problem raises fundamental questions about causation between mental and physical events, the nature of consciousness, <a href="Personal_identity" title="Personal identity">personal identity</a>, and <a href="Free_will" title="Free will">free will</a>. It remains significant in both philosophy and science, influencing fields such as <a href="Cognitive_science" title="Cognitive science">cognitive science</a>, <a href="Neuroscience" title="Neuroscience">neuroscience</a>, <a href="Psychology" title="Psychology">psychology</a>, and <a href="Artificial_intelligence" title="Artificial intelligence">artificial intelligence</a>.

</p><p>In general, the <i>existence</i> of these mind–body connections seems unproblematic. Issues arise, however, when attempting to interpret these relations from a <a href="Metaphysics" title="Metaphysics">metaphysical</a> or scientific perspective. Such reflections raise a number of questions, including:

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<ul><li>Are the mind and body two distinct entities, or a single entity?</li>

<li>If the mind and body are two distinct entities, do the two of them causally interact?</li>

<li>Is it possible for these two distinct entities to causally interact?</li>

<li>What is the nature of this interaction?</li>

<li>Can this interaction ever be an object of empirical study?</li>

<li>If the mind and body are a single entity, then are mental events explicable in terms of physical events, or vice versa?</li>

<li>Is the relation between mental and physical events something that arises <i>de novo</i> at a certain point in development?</li></ul>

<p>These and other questions that discuss the relation between mind and body are questions that all fall under the banner of the 'mind–body problem'.

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Mind–body_interaction_and_mental_causation">Mind–body interaction and mental causation</h2></div>

<p>Philosophers David L. Robb and John F. Heil introduce mental causation in terms of the mind–body problem of interaction:

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</style><blockquote class="templatequote"><p>Mind–body interaction has a central place in our pretheoretic conception of agency. Indeed, mental causation often figures explicitly in formulations of the mind–body problem. Some philosophers insist that the very notion of psychological explanation turns on the intelligibility of mental causation. If your mind and its states, such as your beliefs and desires, were causally isolated from your bodily behavior, then what goes on in your mind could not explain what you do. If psychological explanation goes, so do the closely related notions of agency and moral responsibility. Clearly, a good deal rides on a satisfactory solution to the <a href="Problem_of_mental_causation" title="Problem of mental causation">problem of mental causation</a> [and] there is more than one way in which puzzles about the mind's "causal relevance" to behavior (and to the physical world more generally) can arise.

</p><p>[René Descartes] set the agenda for subsequent discussions of the mind–body relation. According to Descartes, minds and bodies are distinct kinds of "substance". Bodies, he held, are spatially extended substances, incapable of feeling or thought; minds, in contrast, are unextended, thinking, feeling substances. If minds and bodies are radically different kinds of substance, however, it is not easy to see how they "could" causally interact. <a href="Elisabeth_of_the_Palatinate" title="Elisabeth of the Palatinate">Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia</a> puts it forcefully to him in a 1643 letter:

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<blockquote><p>how the human soul can determine the movement of the animal spirits in the body so as to perform voluntary acts—being as it is merely a conscious substance. For the determination of movement seems always to come about from the moving body's being propelled—to depend on the kind of impulse it gets from what sets it in motion, or again, on the nature and shape of this latter thing's surface. Now the first two conditions involve contact, and the third involves that the impelling thing has extension; but you utterly exclude extension from your notion of soul, and contact seems to me incompatible with a thing's being immaterial...</p></blockquote><p>

Elizabeth is expressing the prevailing mechanistic view as to how causation of bodies works. Causal relations countenanced by contemporary physics can take several forms, not all of which are of the push–pull variety.<sup id="cite_ref-sep-mental-causation_3-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-sep-mental-causation-3"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>3<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup></p></blockquote><div class="templatequotecite"><p style="display: inline; padding-left: 2.3em;">— David Robb and John Heil, "Mental Causation" in <i>The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i></p></div>

<p>Contemporary <a href="Neurophilosopher" class="mw-redirect" title="Neurophilosopher">neurophilosopher</a> Georg Northoff suggests that mental causation is compatible with classical formal and final causality.<sup id="cite_ref-Northoff_4-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Northoff-4"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>4<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p><p>Biologist, theoretical neuroscientist and philosopher, <a href="Walter_Jackson_Freeman_III" title="Walter Jackson Freeman III">Walter J. Freeman</a>, suggests that explaining mind–body interaction in terms of "circular causation" is more relevant than linear causation.<sup id="cite_ref-Pockett_5-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Pockett-5"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>5<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p><p>In <a href="Neuroscience" title="Neuroscience">neuroscience</a>, much has been learned about correlations between brain activity and subjective, conscious experiences. Many suggest that neuroscience will ultimately explain consciousness:

"...consciousness is a biological process that will eventually be explained in terms of molecular signaling pathways used by interacting populations of nerve cells..."<sup id="cite_ref-Kandel_6-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Kandel-6"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>6<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> However, this view has been criticized because <i>consciousness</i> has yet to be shown to be a <i>process</i>,<sup id="cite_ref-7" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-7"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>7<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> and the <a href="Hard_problem_of_consciousness" title="Hard problem of consciousness">"hard problem" of relating consciousness</a> directly to brain activity remains elusive.<sup id="cite_ref-Shear_8-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Shear-8"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>8<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

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<blockquote class="templatequote"><p>Cognitive science today gets increasingly interested in the embodiment of human perception, thinking, and action. Abstract information processing models are no longer accepted as satisfactory accounts of the human mind. Interest has shifted to interactions between the material human body and its surroundings and to the way in which such interactions shape the mind. Proponents of this approach have expressed the hope that it will ultimately dissolve the Cartesian divide between the immaterial mind and the material existence of human beings (Damasio, 1994; Gallagher, 2005). A topic that seems particularly promising for providing a bridge across the mind–body cleavage is the study of bodily actions, which are neither reflexive reactions to external stimuli nor indications of mental states, which have only arbitrary relationships to the motor features of the action (e.g., pressing a button for making a choice response). The shape, timing, and effects of such actions are inseparable from their meaning. One might say that they are loaded with mental content, which cannot be appreciated other than by studying their material features. Imitation, communicative gesturing, and tool use are examples of these kinds of actions.<sup id="cite_ref-Goldenberg2008_9-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Goldenberg2008-9"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>9<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup></p></blockquote><div class="templatequotecite"><p style="display: inline; padding-left: 2.3em;">— Georg Goldenberg, "How the Mind Moves the Body: Lessons From Apraxia" in <i>Oxford Handbook of Human Action</i></p></div>

<p>Since 1927, at the Solvay Conference in Austria, European physicists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries realized that the interpretations of their experiments with light and electricity required a different theory to explain why light behaves both as a wave and particle. The implications were profound. The usual empirical model of explaining natural phenomena could not account for this duality of matter and non-matter. In a significant way, this has brought back the conversation on the mind–body duality.<sup id="cite_ref-10" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-10"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>10<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Neural_correlates">Neural correlates</h2></div>

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</style><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="Neural_correlates_of_consciousness" title="Neural correlates of consciousness">Neural correlates of consciousness</a></div>

<p>The <i>neural correlates of consciousness</i> "are the smallest set of brain mechanisms and events sufficient for some specific conscious feeling, as elemental as the color red or as complex as the sensual, mysterious, and primeval sensation evoked when looking at [a] jungle scene..."<sup id="cite_ref-Koch2004p87_12-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Koch2004p87-12"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>12<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> Neuroscientists use empirical approaches to discover <a href="Neural_correlate" class="mw-redirect" title="Neural correlate">neural correlates</a> of subjective phenomena.<sup id="cite_ref-13" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-13"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>13<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Neurobiology_and_neurophilosophy">Neurobiology and neurophilosophy</h3></div>

<div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main articles: <a href="Neurobiology" class="mw-redirect" title="Neurobiology">Neurobiology</a> and <a href="Neurophilosophy" title="Neurophilosophy">Neurophilosophy</a></div>

<p>A science of <a href="Consciousness" title="Consciousness">consciousness</a> must explain the exact relationship between subjective conscious mental states and brain states formed by electrochemical interactions in the body, the so-called <a href="Hard_problem_of_consciousness" title="Hard problem of consciousness">hard problem of consciousness</a>.<sup id="cite_ref-Kandel2_14-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Kandel2-14"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>14<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> <a href="Neurobiology" class="mw-redirect" title="Neurobiology">Neurobiology</a> studies the connection scientifically, as do <a href="Neuropsychology" title="Neuropsychology">neuropsychology</a> and <a href="Neuropsychiatry" title="Neuropsychiatry">neuropsychiatry</a>. <i>Neurophilosophy</i> is the interdisciplinary study of <a href="Neuroscience" title="Neuroscience">neuroscience</a> and <a href="Philosophy_of_mind" title="Philosophy of mind">philosophy of mind</a>. In this pursuit, neurophilosophers, such as <a href="Patricia_Churchland" title="Patricia Churchland">Patricia Churchland</a>,<sup id="cite_ref-Churchland2002_15-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Churchland2002-15"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>15<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-Churchland1989_16-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Churchland1989-16"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>16<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> <a href="Paul_Churchland" title="Paul Churchland">Paul Churchland</a><sup id="cite_ref-Churchland2007_17-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Churchland2007-17"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>17<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> and <a href="Daniel_Dennett" title="Daniel Dennett">Daniel Dennett</a>,<sup id="cite_ref-Dennett1986_18-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Dennett1986-18"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>18<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-Dennett1997_19-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Dennett1997-19"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>19<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> have focused primarily on the body rather than the mind. In this context, neuronal correlates may be viewed as causing consciousness, where consciousness can be thought of as an undefined property that depends upon this <a href="Complex_systems" class="mw-redirect" title="Complex systems">complex</a>, adaptive, and highly interconnected biological system.<sup id="cite_ref-20" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-20"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>20<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> However, it's unknown if discovering and characterizing neural correlates may eventually provide a theory of consciousness that can explain the first-person experience of these "systems", and determine whether other systems of equal complexity lack such features.

</p><p>The massive parallelism of neural networks allows redundant populations of neurons to mediate the same or similar percepts. Nonetheless, it is assumed that every subjective state will have associated neural correlates, which can be manipulated to artificially inhibit or induce the subject's experience of that conscious state. The growing ability of neuroscientists to manipulate neurons using methods from molecular biology in combination with optical tools<sup id="cite_ref-21" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-21"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>21<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> was achieved by the development of behavioral and organic models that are amenable to large-scale genomic analysis and manipulation. Non-human analysis such as this, in combination with imaging of the human brain, have contributed to a robust and increasingly predictive theoretical framework.

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Arousal_and_content">Arousal and content</h3></div>

<p>There are two common but distinct dimensions of the term <i>consciousness</i>,<sup id="cite_ref-23" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-23"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>23<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> one involving <i>arousal</i> and <i>states of consciousness</i> and the other involving <i>content of consciousness</i> and <i>conscious states</i>. To be conscious <i>of</i> something, the brain must be in a relatively high state of arousal (sometimes called <i>vigilance</i>), whether awake or in <a href="REM_sleep" class="mw-redirect" title="REM sleep">REM sleep</a>. Brain arousal level fluctuates in a <a href="Circadian_rhythm" title="Circadian rhythm">circadian rhythm</a> but these natural cycles may be influenced by lack of sleep, alcohol and other drugs, physical exertion, etc. Arousal can be measured behaviorally by the signal amplitude required to trigger a given reaction (for example, the sound level that causes a subject to turn and look toward the source). High arousal states involve conscious states that feature specific perceptual content, planning and recollection or even fantasy. Clinicians use scoring systems such as the <a href="Glasgow_Coma_Scale" title="Glasgow Coma Scale">Glasgow Coma Scale</a> to assess the level of arousal in patients with <i>impaired states of consciousness</i> such as the <a href="Coma" title="Coma">comatose state</a>, the <a href="Persistent_vegetative_state" class="mw-redirect" title="Persistent vegetative state">persistent vegetative state</a>, and the <a href="Minimally_conscious_state" title="Minimally conscious state">minimally conscious state</a>. Here, "state" refers to different amounts of externalized, physical consciousness: ranging from a total absence in coma, persistent vegetative state and <a href="General_anesthesia" class="mw-redirect" title="General anesthesia">general anesthesia</a>, to a fluctuating, minimally conscious state, such as sleep walking and <a href="Epileptic" class="mw-redirect" title="Epileptic">epileptic</a> seizure.<sup id="cite_ref-24" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-24"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>24<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p><p>Many nuclei with distinct chemical signatures in the <a href="Thalamus" title="Thalamus">thalamus</a>, <a href="Midbrain" title="Midbrain">midbrain</a> and <a href="Pons" title="Pons">pons</a> must function for a subject to be in a sufficient state of brain arousal to experience anything at all. These nuclei therefore belong to the enabling factors for consciousness. Conversely it is likely that the specific content of any particular conscious sensation is mediated by particular neurons in the cortex and their associated satellite structures, including the <a href="Amygdala" title="Amygdala">amygdala</a>, <a href="Thalamus" title="Thalamus">thalamus</a>, <a href="Claustrum" title="Claustrum">claustrum</a> and the <a href="Basal_ganglia" title="Basal ganglia">basal ganglia</a>.

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Theoretical_frameworks">Theoretical frameworks</h2></div>

<p>A variety of approaches have been proposed. Most are either <a href="Dualism_(philosophy_of_mind)" class="mw-redirect" title="Dualism (philosophy of mind)">dualist</a> or <a href="Monism" title="Monism">monist</a>. Dualism maintains a rigid distinction between the realms of mind and matter. <a href="Monism" title="Monism">Monism</a> maintains that there is only one unifying reality as in neutral or substance or essence, in terms of which everything can be explained.

</p><p>Each of these categories contains numerous variants. The two main forms of dualism are <a href="Substance_dualism" class="mw-redirect" title="Substance dualism">substance dualism</a>, which holds that the mind is formed of a distinct type of substance not governed by the laws of physics, and <a href="Property_dualism" title="Property dualism">property dualism</a>, which holds that mental properties involving conscious experience are fundamental properties, alongside the fundamental properties identified by a completed physics. The three main forms of monism are <a href="Physicalism" title="Physicalism">physicalism</a>, which holds that the mind consists of matter organized in a particular way; <a href="Idealism" title="Idealism">idealism</a>, which holds that only thought truly exists and matter is merely a representation of mental processes; and <a href="Neutral_monism" title="Neutral monism">neutral monism</a>, which holds that both mind and matter are aspects of a distinct essence that is itself identical to neither of them. <a href="Psychophysical_parallelism" title="Psychophysical parallelism">Psychophysical parallelism</a> is a third possible alternative regarding the relation between mind and body, between interaction (dualism) and one-sided action (monism).<sup id="cite_ref-25" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-25"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>25<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p><p>Several philosophical perspectives that have sought to escape the problem by rejecting the mind–body dichotomy have been developed. The <a href="Historical_materialism" title="Historical materialism">historical materialism</a> of <a href="Karl_Marx" title="Karl Marx">Karl Marx</a> and subsequent writers, itself a form of physicalism, held that consciousness was engendered by the material contingencies of one's environment.<sup id="cite_ref-26" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-26"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>26<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> An explicit rejection of the dichotomy is found in French <a href="Structuralism" title="Structuralism">structuralism</a>, and is a position that generally characterized post-war <a href="Continental_philosophy" title="Continental philosophy">Continental philosophy</a>.<sup id="cite_ref-Turner_27-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Turner-27"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>27<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p><p>An ancient model of the mind known as the Five-Aggregate Model, described in the Buddhist teachings, explains the mind as continuously changing sense impressions and mental phenomena.<sup id="cite_ref-Aggregates_28-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Aggregates-28"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>28<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> Considering this model, it is possible to understand that it is the constantly changing sense impressions and mental phenomena (i.e., the mind) that experience/analyze all external phenomena in the world as well as all internal phenomena including the body anatomy, the nervous system as well as the organ brain. This conceptualization leads to two levels of analyses: (i) analyses conducted from a third-person perspective on how the brain works, and (ii) analyzing the moment-to-moment manifestation of an individual's mind-stream (analyses conducted from a first-person perspective). Considering the latter, the manifestation of the mind-stream is described as happening in every person all the time, even in a scientist who analyzes various phenomena in the world, including analyzing and hypothesizing about the organ brain.<sup id="cite_ref-Aggregates_28-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Aggregates-28"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>28<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p><p><a href="Christian_List" title="Christian List">Christian List</a> argues that Benj Hellie's <a href="Vertiginous_question" title="Vertiginous question">vertiginous question</a>, i.e. why an individual exists as themselves and not as someone else, and the existence of first-personal facts, is evidence against <a href="Physicalism" title="Physicalism">physicalism</a>. However, according to List, this is also evidence against other third-personal <a href="Metaphysics" title="Metaphysics">metaphysical</a> pictures, including standard versions of <a href="Mind%E2%80%93body_dualism" title="Mind–body dualism">dualism</a>.<sup id="cite_ref-29" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-29"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>29<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> List also argues that the vertiginous question implies a "quadrilemma" for theories of consciousness. He claims that at most three of the following metaphysical claims can be true: 'first-person <a href="Philosophical_realism" title="Philosophical realism">realism</a>', 'non-<a href="Solipsism" title="Solipsism">solipsism</a>', 'non-fragmentation', and 'one world' – and thus one of these four must be rejected.<sup id="cite_ref-30" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-30"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>30<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> List has proposed a model he calls the "many-worlds theory of consciousness" in order to reconcile the subjective nature of consciousness without lapsing into solipsism.<sup id="cite_ref-31" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-31"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>31<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Dualism">Dualism</h3></div>

<p>The following is a very brief account of some contributions to the mind–body problem.

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Interactionism">Interactionism</h4></div>

<div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="Interactionism_(philosophy_of_mind)" title="Interactionism (philosophy of mind)">Interactionism (philosophy of mind)</a></div>

<p>The viewpoint of interactionism suggests that the mind and body are two separate substances, but that each can affect the other.<sup id="cite_ref-:1_32-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-:1-32"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>32<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> This interaction between the mind and body was first put forward by the philosopher <a href="Ren%C3%A9_Descartes" title="René Descartes">René Descartes</a>. Descartes believed that the mind was non-physical and permeated the entire body, but that the mind and body interacted via the <a href="Pineal_gland" title="Pineal gland">pineal gland</a>.<sup id="cite_ref-33" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-33"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>33<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-34" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-34"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>34<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> This theory has changed throughout the years, and in the 20th century its main adherents were the philosopher of science <a href="Karl_Popper" title="Karl Popper">Karl Popper</a> and the neurophysiologist <a href="John_Carew_Eccles" class="mw-redirect" title="John Carew Eccles">John Carew Eccles</a>.<sup id="cite_ref-35" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-35"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>35<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-36" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-36"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>36<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> A more recent and popular version of Interactionism is the viewpoint of <a href="Emergentism" title="Emergentism">emergentism</a>.<sup id="cite_ref-:1_32-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-:1-32"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>32<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> This perspective states that mental states are a result of the brain states, and that the mental events can then influence the brain, resulting in a two way communication between the mind and body.<sup id="cite_ref-:1_32-2" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-:1-32"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>32<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p><p>The absence of an empirically identifiable meeting point between the non-physical mind (if there is such a thing) and its physical extension (if there is such a thing) has been raised as a criticism of interactionalist dualism. This criticism has led many modern philosophers of mind to maintain that the mind is not something separate from the body.<sup id="cite_ref-Kim1_37-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Kim1-37"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>37<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> These approaches have been particularly influential in the sciences, particularly in the fields of <a href="Sociobiology" title="Sociobiology">sociobiology</a>, <a href="Computer_science" title="Computer science">computer science</a>, <a href="Evolutionary_psychology" title="Evolutionary psychology">evolutionary psychology</a>, and the <a href="Neuroscience" title="Neuroscience">neurosciences</a>.<sup id="cite_ref-PsyBio_38-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-PsyBio-38"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>38<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-LeDoux_39-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-LeDoux-39"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>39<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-RussNor_40-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-RussNor-40"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>40<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-DawkRich_41-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-DawkRich-41"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>41<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p><p><a href="Avshalom_Elitzur" title="Avshalom Elitzur">Avshalom Elitzur</a> has defended interactionism and has described himself as a "reluctant dualist". One argument Elitzur makes in favor of dualism is an argument from bafflement. According to Elitzur, a conscious being can conceive of a P-zombie version of his/herself. However, a P-zombie cannot conceive of a version of itself that lacks corresponding qualia.<sup id="cite_ref-42" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-42"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>42<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Epiphenomenalism">Epiphenomenalism</h4></div>

<div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="Epiphenomenalism" title="Epiphenomenalism">Epiphenomenalism</a></div>

<p>The viewpoint of epiphenomenalism suggests that the physical brain can cause mental events in the mind, but that the mind cannot interact with the brain at all; stating that mental occurrences are simply a side effect of the brain's processes.<sup id="cite_ref-:1_32-3" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-:1-32"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>32<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> This viewpoint explains that while one's body may react to them feeling joy, fear, or sadness, that the emotion does not cause the physical response. Rather, it explains that joy, fear, sadness, and all bodily reactions are caused by chemicals and their interaction with the body.<sup id="cite_ref-43" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-43"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>43<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Psychophysical_parallelism">Psychophysical parallelism</h4></div>

<div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="Psychophysical_parallelism" title="Psychophysical parallelism">Psychophysical parallelism</a></div>

<p>The viewpoint of psychophysical parallelism suggests that the mind and body are entirely independent from one another. Furthermore, this viewpoint states that both mental and physical stimuli and reactions are experienced simultaneously by both the mind and body, however, there is no interaction nor communication between the two.<sup id="cite_ref-:1_32-4" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-:1-32"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>32<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-44" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-44"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>44<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading5"><h5 id="Double_aspectism">Double aspectism</h5></div>

<div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="Double-aspectism" class="mw-redirect" title="Double-aspectism">Double aspectism</a></div>

<p>Double aspectism is an extension of psychophysical parallelism which also suggests that the mind and body cannot interact, nor can they be separated.<sup id="cite_ref-:1_32-5" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-:1-32"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>32<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> <a href="Baruch_Spinoza" title="Baruch Spinoza">Baruch Spinoza</a> and <a href="Gustav_Fechner" title="Gustav Fechner">Gustav Fechner</a> were two of the notable users of double aspectism, however, Fechner later expanded upon it to form the branch of psychophysics in an attempt to prove the relationship of the mind and body.<sup id="cite_ref-45" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-45"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>45<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading5"><h5 id="Pre-established_harmony">Pre-established harmony</h5></div>

<p>The viewpoint of pre-established harmony is another offshoot of psychophysical parallelism which suggests that mental events and bodily events are separate and distinct, but that they are both coordinated by an external agent: an example of such an agent could be God.<sup id="cite_ref-:1_32-6" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-:1-32"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>32<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> A notable adherent to the idea of pre-established harmony is <a href="Gottfried_Wilhelm_Leibniz" title="Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz">Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz</a> in his theory of Monadology.<sup id="cite_ref-46" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-46"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>46<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> His explanation of pre-established harmony relied heavily upon God as the external agent who coordinated the mental and bodily events of all things in the beginning.<sup id="cite_ref-47" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-47"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>47<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p><p><a href="Gottfried_Wilhelm_Leibniz" title="Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz">Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz</a>'s theory of <b>pre-established harmony</b> (<a href="French_language" title="French language">French</a>: <i lang="fr">harmonie préétablie</i>) is a <a href="Philosophy" title="Philosophy">philosophical</a> theory about <a href="Causality" title="Causality">causation</a> under which every "<a href="Substance_theory" title="Substance theory">substance</a>" affects only itself, but all the substances (both bodies and <a href="Philosophy_of_mind" title="Philosophy of mind">minds</a>) in the world nevertheless seem to causally interact with each other because they have been programmed by <a href="God" title="God">God</a> in advance to "harmonize" with each other. Leibniz's term for these substances was "<a href="Monad_(philosophy)" title="Monad (philosophy)">monads</a>", which he described in a popular work (<i><a href="Monadology" title="Monadology">Monadology</a></i> §7) as "windowless".

</p><p>The concept of pre-established harmony can be understood by considering an event with both seemingly mental and physical aspects. For example, consider saying 'ouch' after stubbing one's toe. There are two general ways to describe this event: in terms of mental events (where the conscious sensation of pain <i>caused</i> one to say 'ouch') and in terms of physical events (where neural firings in one's toe, carried to the brain, are what caused one to say 'ouch'). The main task of the mind–body problem is figuring out how these mental events (the feeling of pain) and physical events (the nerve firings) relate. Leibniz's pre-established harmony attempts to answer this puzzle, by saying that mental and physical events are not genuinely related in any causal sense, but only seem to interact due to psycho-physical fine-tuning.

</p><p>Leibniz's theory is best known as a solution to the mind–body problem of how mind can interact with the body. Leibniz rejected the idea of physical bodies affecting each other, and explained <i>all</i> physical causation in this way.

</p><p>Under pre-established harmony, the preprogramming of each mind must be extremely complex, since only it causes its own thoughts or actions, for as long as it exists. To appear to interact, each substance's "program" must contain a description of either the entire universe, or of how the object behaves at all times during all interactions that appear to occur.

</p><p>An example:

</p>

<dl><dd>An apple falls on Alice's head, apparently causing the experience of pain in her mind. In fact, the apple does not cause the pain—the pain is caused by some previous state of Alice's mind. If Alice then seems to shake her hand in anger, it is not actually her mind that causes this, but some previous state of her hand.</dd></dl>

<p>Note that if a mind behaves as a windowless monad, there is no need for any other object to exist to create that mind's sense perceptions, leading to a <a href="Solipsism" title="Solipsism">solipsistic</a> universe that consists only of that mind. Leibniz seems to admit this in his <i><a href="Discourse_on_Metaphysics" title="Discourse on Metaphysics">Discourse on Metaphysics</a></i>, section 14. However, he claims that his principle of harmony, according to which <a href="God" title="God">God</a> creates the best and most harmonious world possible, dictates that the <a href="Perception" title="Perception">perceptions</a> (internal states) of each <a href="Monad_(philosophy)" title="Monad (philosophy)">monad</a> "expresses" the world in its entirety, and the world expressed by the monad actually exists. Although Leibniz says that each monad is "windowless", he also claims that it functions as a "mirror" of the entire created universe.

</p><p>On occasion, Leibniz styled himself as "the author of the system of pre-established harmony".<sup id="cite_ref-48" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-48"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>48<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p><p><a href="Immanuel_Kant" title="Immanuel Kant">Immanuel Kant</a>'s professor <a href="Martin_Knutzen" title="Martin Knutzen">Martin Knutzen</a> regarded pre-established harmony as "the pillow for the lazy mind".<sup id="cite_ref-49" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-49"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>49<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p><p>In his sixth <i><a href="Meditations_on_First_Philosophy#Summary_and_analysis" title="Meditations on First Philosophy">Metaphysical Meditation</a></i>, Descartes talked about a "coordinated disposition of created things set up by God", shortly after having identified "nature in its general aspect" with God himself. His conception of the relationship between God and his normative nature actualized in the existing world recalls both the pre-established harmony of Leibniz and the <a href="Deus_sive_Natura" class="mw-redirect" title="Deus sive Natura">Deus sive Natura</a> of <a href="Baruch_Spinoza" title="Baruch Spinoza">Baruch Spinoza</a>.<sup id="cite_ref-50" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-50"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>50<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading5"><h5 id="Occasionalism">Occasionalism</h5></div>

<div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="Occasionalism" title="Occasionalism">Occasionalism</a></div>

<p>The viewpoint of Occasionalism is another offshoot of psychophysical parallelism, however, the major difference is that the mind and body have some indirect interaction. Occasionalism suggests that the mind and body are separate and distinct, but that they interact through divine intervention.<sup id="cite_ref-:1_32-7" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-:1-32"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>32<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> <a href="Nicolas_Malebranche" title="Nicolas Malebranche">Nicolas Malebranche</a> was one of the main contributors to this idea, using it as a way to address his disagreements with Descartes' view of the mind–body problem.<sup id="cite_ref-:2_51-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-:2-51"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>51<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> In Malebranche's occasionalism, he viewed thoughts as a wish for the body to move, which was then fulfilled by God causing the body to act.<sup id="cite_ref-:2_51-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-:2-51"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>51<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Historical_background">Historical background</h2></div>

<p>The problem was popularized by <a href="Ren%C3%A9_Descartes" title="René Descartes">René Descartes</a> in the <a href="17th_century" title="17th century">17th century</a>, which resulted in <a href="Cartesian_dualism" class="mw-redirect" title="Cartesian dualism">Cartesian dualism</a>, also by pre-<a href="Aristotelianism" title="Aristotelianism">Aristotelian</a> philosophers,<sup id="cite_ref-Young_52-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Young-52"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>52<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-Robinson_53-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Robinson-53"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>53<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> in <a href="Avicennism" title="Avicennism">Avicennian philosophy</a>,<sup id="cite_ref-Lagerlund_54-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Lagerlund-54"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>54<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> and in earlier <a href="Eastern_Philosophy" class="mw-redirect" title="Eastern Philosophy">Asian traditions</a>.

</p>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="The_Buddha">The Buddha</h3></div>

<div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">See also: <a href="Gautama_Buddha" class="mw-redirect" title="Gautama Buddha">Gautama Buddha</a>, <a href="Buddhism_and_the_body" title="Buddhism and the body">Buddhism and the body</a>, and <a href="Prat%C4%ABtyasamutp%C4%81da" title="Pratītyasamutpāda">Pratītyasamutpāda</a></div>

<p><a href="The_Buddha" title="The Buddha">The Buddha</a> (480–400 B.C.E), founder of <a href="Buddhism" title="Buddhism">Buddhism</a>, described the mind and the body as depending on each other in a way that two sheaves of reeds were to stand leaning against one another<sup id="cite_ref-55" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-55"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>55<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> and taught that the world consists of mind and matter which work together, interdependently. Buddhist teachings describe the mind as manifesting from moment to moment, one thought moment at a time as a fast flowing stream.<sup id="cite_ref-Aggregates_28-2" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Aggregates-28"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>28<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> The components that make up the mind are known as the five aggregates (i.e., material form, feelings, perception, volition, and sensory consciousness), which arise and pass away continuously. The arising and passing of these aggregates in the present moment is described as being influenced by five causal laws: biological laws, psychological laws, physical laws, volitional laws, and universal laws.<sup id="cite_ref-Aggregates_28-3" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Aggregates-28"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>28<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> The Buddhist practice of <a href="Mindfulness" title="Mindfulness">mindfulness</a> involves attending to this constantly changing mind-stream.

</p><p>Ultimately, the Buddha's philosophy is that both mind and forms are conditionally arising qualities of an ever-changing universe in which, when <a href="Nirvana_(Buddhism)" title="Nirvana (Buddhism)">nirvāna</a> is attained, all phenomenal experience ceases to exist.<sup id="cite_ref-56" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-56"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>56<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> According to the <a href="Anatta" class="mw-redirect" title="Anatta">anattā</a> doctrine of the Buddha, the conceptual self is a mere mental construct of an individual entity and is basically an impermanent illusion, sustained by form, sensation, perception, thought and consciousness.<sup id="cite_ref-57" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-57"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>57<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> The Buddha argued that mentally clinging to any views will result in delusion and stress,<sup id="cite_ref-58" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-58"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>58<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> since, according to the Buddha, a real self (conceptual self, being the basis of standpoints and views) cannot be found when the mind has clarity.

</p>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Plato">Plato</h3></div>

<div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">See also: <a href="Plato" title="Plato">Plato</a> and <a href="Theory_of_forms" title="Theory of forms">Theory of forms</a></div>

<p><a href="Plato" title="Plato">Plato</a> (429–347 B.C.E.) believed that the material world is a shadow of a higher reality that consists of concepts he called Forms. According to Plato, objects in our everyday world "participate in" these Forms, which confer identity and meaning to material objects. For example, a circle drawn in the sand would be a circle only because it participates in the concept of an ideal circle that exists somewhere in the world of Forms. He argued that, as the body is from the material world, the soul is from the world of Forms and is thus immortal. He believed the soul was temporarily united with the body and would only be separated at death, when it, if pure, would return to the world of <a href="Theory_of_forms" title="Theory of forms">Forms</a>; otherwise, reincarnation follows. Since the soul does not exist in time and space, as the body does, it can access universal truths. For Plato, ideas (or Forms) are the true reality, and are experienced by the soul. The body is for Plato empty in that it cannot access the <a href="Theory_of_forms" title="Theory of forms">abstract reality</a> of the world; it can only experience shadows. This is determined by Plato's essentially <a href="Rationalism" title="Rationalism">rationalistic</a> <a href="Epistemology" title="Epistemology">epistemology</a>.<sup id="cite_ref-59" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-59"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>59<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Aristotle">Aristotle</h3></div>

<div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="Hylomorphism#Body–soul_hylomorphism" title="Hylomorphism">Hylomorphism § Body–soul hylomorphism</a></div>

<p>For <a href="Aristotle" title="Aristotle">Aristotle</a> (384–322 BC) <i>mind</i> is a faculty of the <i>soul</i>.<sup id="cite_ref-60" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-60"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>60<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-61" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-61"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>61<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> Regarding the soul, he said:

</p>

<blockquote class="templatequote"><p>It is not necessary to ask whether soul and body are one, just as it is not necessary to ask whether the wax and its shape are one, nor generally whether the matter of each thing and that of which it is the matter are one. For even if one and being are spoken of in several ways, what is properly so spoken of is the actuality.</p></blockquote><div class="templatequotecite"><p style="display: inline; padding-left: 2.3em;">— <i><a href="On_the_Soul" title="On the Soul">De Anima</a></i> ii 1, 412b6–9</p></div>

<p>In the end, Aristotle saw the relation between soul and body as uncomplicated, in the same way that it is uncomplicated that a cubical shape is a property of a toy building block. The soul is a property exhibited by the body, one among many. Moreover, Aristotle proposed that when the body perishes, so does the soul, just as the shape of a building block disappears with destruction of the block.<sup id="cite_ref-Shields_62-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Shields-62"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>62<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Medieval_Aristotelianism">Medieval Aristotelianism</h4></div>

<p>Working in the Aristotelian-influenced tradition of <a href="Thomism" title="Thomism">Thomism</a>, <a href="Thomas_Aquinas" title="Thomas Aquinas">Thomas Aquinas</a> (1225–1274), like Aristotle, believed that the mind and the body are one, like a seal and wax; therefore, it is pointless to ask whether or not they are one. However, (referring to "mind" as "the soul") he asserted that the soul persists after the death of the body in spite of their unity, calling the soul "this particular thing". Since his view was primarily theological rather than philosophical, it is impossible to fit it neatly within either the category of <a href="Physicalism" title="Physicalism">physicalism</a> or <a href="Dualism_(philosophy_of_mind)" class="mw-redirect" title="Dualism (philosophy of mind)">dualism</a>.<sup id="cite_ref-63" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-63"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>63<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Influences_of_Eastern_monotheistic_religions">Influences of Eastern monotheistic religions</h3></div>

<div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main articles: <a href="Dualistic_cosmology" class="mw-redirect" title="Dualistic cosmology">Dualistic cosmology</a> and <a href="Gnosticism" title="Gnosticism">Gnosticism</a></div>

<p>In <a href="Religious_philosophy" title="Religious philosophy">religious philosophy</a> of Eastern <a href="Monotheism" title="Monotheism">monotheism</a>, dualism denotes a <a href="Binary_opposition" title="Binary opposition">binary opposition</a> of an idea that contains two essential parts. The first formal concept of a "mind–body" split may be found in the <a href="Divinity" title="Divinity">divinity</a>–<a href="Secularity" title="Secularity">secularity</a> dualism of the ancient Persian religion of <a href="Zoroastrianism" title="Zoroastrianism">Zoroastrianism</a> around the mid-fifth century BC. <a href="Gnosticism" title="Gnosticism">Gnosticism</a> is a modern name for a variety of ancient dualistic ideas inspired by <a href="Judaism" title="Judaism">Judaism</a> popular in the first and second century AD. These ideas later seem to have been incorporated into <a href="Galen" title="Galen">Galen</a>'s <i>"tripartite soul"</i> <sup id="cite_ref-64" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-64"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>64<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> that led into both the Christian sentiments<sup id="cite_ref-65" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-65"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>65<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> expressed in the later <a href="Augustinian_theodicy" title="Augustinian theodicy">Augustinian theodicy</a> and <a href="Avicenna" title="Avicenna">Avicenna</a>'s <a href="Platonism_in_Islamic_Philosophy" class="mw-redirect" title="Platonism in Islamic Philosophy">Platonism in Islamic Philosophy</a>.

</p>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Descartes">Descartes</h3></div>

<div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="Ren%C3%A9_Descartes" title="René Descartes">René Descartes</a></div>

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</style><table class="sidebar sidebar-collapse nomobile nowraplinks"><tbody><tr><td class="sidebar-pretitle">Part of a series on</td></tr><tr><th class="sidebar-title-with-pretitle"><a href="Ren%C3%A9_Descartes" title="René Descartes">René Descartes</a></th></tr><tr><td class="sidebar-image" style="padding:0.6em;"><span typeof="mw:File"></span></td></tr><tr><td class="sidebar-content">

<div class="sidebar-list mw-collapsible mw-collapsed"><div class="sidebar-list-title" style="background:transparent;border-top:1px solid #aaa;text-align:center;;color: var(--color-base)">Philosophy</div><div class="sidebar-list-content mw-collapsible-content hlist">

<ul><li><a href="Cartesianism" title="Cartesianism">Cartesianism</a></li>

<li><a href="Rationalism" title="Rationalism">Rationalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Foundationalism" title="Foundationalism">Foundationalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Mechanism_(philosophy)" title="Mechanism (philosophy)">Mechanism</a></li>

<li><a href="Cartesian_doubt" title="Cartesian doubt">Doubt and certainty</a></li>

<li><a href="Existence_of_God" title="Existence of God">Existence of God</a></li>

<li><a href="Dream_argument" title="Dream argument">Dream argument</a></li>

<li><i><a href="Cogito%2C_ergo_sum" title="Cogito, ergo sum">Cogito, ergo sum</a></i></li>

<li><a href="Evil_demon" title="Evil demon">Evil demon</a></li>

<li><a href="Trademark_argument" title="Trademark argument">Trademark argument</a></li>

<li><a href="Causal_adequacy_principle" title="Causal adequacy principle">Causal adequacy principle</a></li>

<li><a href="Analytic_geometry" title="Analytic geometry">Analytic geometry</a></li>

<li><a href="Cartesian_coordinate_system" title="Cartesian coordinate system">Coordinate system</a></li>

<li><a href="Cartesian_circle" title="Cartesian circle">Cartesian circle</a></li>

<li><a href="Folium_of_Descartes" title="Folium of Descartes">Folium</a></li>

<li><a href="Descartes'_rule_of_signs" title="Descartes' rule of signs">Rule of signs</a></li>

<li><a href="Cartesian_diver" title="Cartesian diver">Cartesian diver</a></li>

<li><a href="Balloonist_theory" title="Balloonist theory">Balloonist theory</a></li>

<li><a href="Wax_argument" title="Wax argument">Wax argument</a></li>

<li><i><a href="Mental_substance" title="Mental substance">Res cogitans</a></i></li>

<li><i><a href="Res_extensa" title="Res extensa">Res extensa</a></i></li></ul></div></div></td>

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<div class="sidebar-list mw-collapsible mw-collapsed"><div class="sidebar-list-title" style="background:transparent;border-top:1px solid #aaa;text-align:center;;color: var(--color-base)">Works</div><div class="sidebar-list-content mw-collapsible-content hlist">

<ul><li><a href="Rules_for_the_Direction_of_the_Mind" title="Rules for the Direction of the Mind">Rules for the Direction of the Mind</a></li>

<li><a href="The_Search_for_Truth_by_Natural_Light" title="The Search for Truth by Natural Light">The Search for Truth</a></li>

<li><a href="The_World_(Descartes)" class="mw-redirect" title="The World (Descartes)">The World</a></li>

<li><a href="Discourse_on_the_Method" title="Discourse on the Method">Discourse on the Method</a></li>

<li><a href="La_G%C3%A9om%C3%A9trie" title="La Géométrie">La Géométrie</a></li>

<li><a href="Meditations_on_First_Philosophy" title="Meditations on First Philosophy">Meditations on First Philosophy</a></li>

<li><a href="Principles_of_Philosophy" title="Principles of Philosophy">Principles of Philosophy</a></li>

<li><a href="Passions_of_the_Soul" title="Passions of the Soul">Passions of the Soul</a></li></ul></div></div></td>

</tr><tr><td class="sidebar-content">

<div class="sidebar-list mw-collapsible mw-collapsed"><div class="sidebar-list-title" style="background:transparent;border-top:1px solid #aaa;text-align:center;;color: var(--color-base)">People</div><div class="sidebar-list-content mw-collapsible-content hlist">

<ul><li><a href="Christina%2C_Queen_of_Sweden" title="Christina, Queen of Sweden">Christina, Queen of Sweden</a></li>

<li><a href="Francine_Descartes" title="Francine Descartes">Francine Descartes</a></li></ul></div></div></td>

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<p><a href="Ren%C3%A9_Descartes" title="René Descartes">René Descartes</a> (1596–1650) believed that mind exerted control over the brain <i>via</i> the <a href="Pineal_gland" title="Pineal gland">pineal gland</a>:

</p>

<blockquote class="templatequote"><p>My view is that this gland is the principal seat of the soul, and the place in which all our thoughts are formed.<sup id="cite_ref-Lokhorst_66-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Lokhorst-66"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>66<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup></p></blockquote><div class="templatequotecite"><p style="display: inline; padding-left: 2.3em;">— René Descartes, <i>Treatise of Man</i></p></div><blockquote class="templatequote"><p>[The] mechanism of our body is so constructed that simply by this gland's being moved in any way by the soul or by any other cause, it drives the surrounding spirits towards the pores of the brain, which direct them through the nerves to the muscles; and in this way the gland makes the spirits move the limbs.<sup id="cite_ref-Lokhorst1_67-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Lokhorst1-67"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>67<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup></p></blockquote><div class="templatequotecite"><p style="display: inline; padding-left: 2.3em;">— René Descartes, <i><a href="Passions_of_the_Soul" title="Passions of the Soul">Passions of the Soul</a></i></p></div>

<p>His posited relation between mind and body is called <a href="Cartesian_dualism" class="mw-redirect" title="Cartesian dualism">Cartesian dualism</a> or <a href="Substance_dualism" class="mw-redirect" title="Substance dualism">substance dualism</a>. He held that <i>mind</i> was distinct from <i>matter</i>, but could influence matter. How such an interaction could be exerted remains a contentious issue.

</p>

<div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="Immanuel_Kant" title="Immanuel Kant">Immanuel Kant</a></div>

<p>For <a href="Immanuel_Kant" title="Immanuel Kant">Immanuel Kant</a> (1724–1804) beyond <i>mind</i> and <i>matter</i> there exists a world of <i>a priori</i> forms, which are seen as necessary preconditions for understanding. Some of these forms, space and time being examples, today seem to be pre-programmed in the brain.

</p>

<blockquote class="templatequote"><p>...whatever it is that impinges on us from the mind-independent world does not come located in a spatial or a temporal matrix,...The mind has two pure forms of intuition built into it to allow it to... organize this 'manifold of raw intuition'.<sup id="cite_ref-Brook_68-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Brook-68"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>68<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup></p></blockquote><div class="templatequotecite"><p style="display: inline; padding-left: 2.3em;">— <a href="Andrew_Brook" title="Andrew Brook">Andrew Brook</a>, <i>Kant's view of the mind and consciousness of self: Transcendental aesthetic</i></p></div>

<p>Kant views the mind–body interaction as taking place through forces that may be of different kinds for mind and body.<sup id="cite_ref-Watkins_69-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Watkins-69"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>69<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Huxley">Huxley</h3></div>

<div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="Thomas_Henry_Huxley" title="Thomas Henry Huxley">Thomas Henry Huxley</a></div>

<p>For <a href="Thomas_Henry_Huxley" title="Thomas Henry Huxley">Thomas Henry Huxley</a> (1825–1895) the conscious mind was a by-product of the brain that has no influence upon the brain, a so-called <a href="Epiphenomenalism" title="Epiphenomenalism">epiphenomenon</a>.

</p>

<blockquote class="templatequote"><p>On the epiphenomenalist view, mental events play no causal role. Huxley, who held the view, compared mental events to a steam whistle that contributes nothing to the work of a locomotive.<sup id="cite_ref-Robinson2_70-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Robinson2-70"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>70<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup></p></blockquote><div class="templatequotecite"><p style="display: inline; padding-left: 2.3em;">— William Robinson, <i>Epiphenomenalism</i></p></div>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Whitehead">Whitehead</h3></div>

<div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="Alfred_North_Whitehead" title="Alfred North Whitehead">Alfred North Whitehead</a></div>

<p><a href="Alfred_North_Whitehead" title="Alfred North Whitehead">Alfred North Whitehead</a> advocated a sophisticated form of <a href="Panpsychism" title="Panpsychism">panpsychism</a> that has been called by <a href="David_Ray_Griffin" title="David Ray Griffin">David Ray Griffin</a> <i><a href="Panpsychism#Panexperientialism" title="Panpsychism">panexperientialism</a></i>.<sup id="cite_ref-71" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-71"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>71<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Popper">Popper</h3></div>

<div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="Karl_Popper" title="Karl Popper">Karl Popper</a></div>

<p>For <a href="Karl_Popper" title="Karl Popper">Karl Popper</a> (1902–1994) there are <i>three</i> aspects of the mind–body problem: the worlds of matter, mind, and of the creations of the mind, such as <a href="Mathematics" title="Mathematics">mathematics</a>. In his view, the third-world creations of the mind could be interpreted by the second-world mind and used to affect the first-world of matter. An example might be <a href="Radio" title="Radio">radio</a>, an example of the interpretation of the third-world (Maxwell's <a href="Electromagnetic_theory" class="mw-redirect" title="Electromagnetic theory">electromagnetic theory</a>) by the second-world mind to suggest modifications of the external first world.

</p>

<blockquote class="templatequote"><p>The body–mind problem is the question of whether and how our thought processes in World 2 are bound up with brain events in World 1. ...I would argue that the first and oldest of these attempted solutions is the only one that deserves to be taken seriously [namely]: World 2 and World 1 interact, so that when someone reads a book or listens to a lecture, brain events occur that <i>act</i> upon the World 2 of the reader's or listener's thoughts; and conversely, when a mathematician follows a proof, his World 2 <i>acts</i> upon his brain and thus upon World 1. This, then, is the thesis of body–mind interaction.<sup id="cite_ref-Popper_72-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Popper-72"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>72<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup></p></blockquote><div class="templatequotecite"><p style="display: inline; padding-left: 2.3em;">— Karl Popper, <i>Notes of a realist on the body–mind problem</i></p></div>

<div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="Gilbert_Ryle" title="Gilbert Ryle">Gilbert Ryle</a></div>

<p>With his 1949 book, <i><a href="The_Concept_of_Mind" title="The Concept of Mind">The Concept of Mind</a></i>, <a href="Gilbert_Ryle" title="Gilbert Ryle">Gilbert Ryle</a> "was seen to have put the final nail in the coffin of Cartesian dualism".<sup id="cite_ref-73" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-73"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>73<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p><p>

In the chapter "Descartes' Myth," Ryle introduces "the dogma of the <a href="Ghost_in_the_machine" title="Ghost in the machine">Ghost in the machine</a>" to describe the philosophical concept of the mind as an entity separate from the body:</p><blockquote><p>I hope to prove that it is entirely false, and false not in detail but in principle. It is not merely an assemblage of particular mistakes. It is one big mistake and a mistake of a special kind. It is, namely, a category mistake.</p></blockquote>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Searle">Searle</h3></div>

<div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="John_Searle" title="John Searle">John Searle</a></div>

<p>For <a href="John_Searle" title="John Searle">John Searle</a> (b. 1932) the mind–body problem is a <a href="False_dichotomy" class="mw-redirect" title="False dichotomy">false dichotomy</a>; that is, mind is a perfectly ordinary aspect of the brain. Searle proposed <a href="Biological_naturalism" title="Biological naturalism">biological naturalism</a> in 1980.

</p>

<blockquote class="templatequote"><p>According to Searle then, there is no more a mind–body problem than there is a macro–micro economics problem. They are different levels of description of the same set of phenomena. [...] But Searle is careful to maintain that the mental – the domain of qualitative experience and understanding – is autonomous and has no counterpart on the microlevel; any redescription of these macroscopic features amounts to a kind of evisceration, ...<sup id="cite_ref-Searle_74-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Searle-74"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>74<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup></p></blockquote><div class="templatequotecite"><p style="display: inline; padding-left: 2.3em;">— Joshua Rust, <i>John Searle</i></p></div>

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<ul><li><a href="Binding_problem" title="Binding problem">Binding problem</a></li>

<li><a href="Bodymind" title="Bodymind">Bodymind</a></li>

<li><a href="Chinese_room" title="Chinese room">Chinese room</a></li>

<li><a href="Cognitive_closure_(philosophy)" title="Cognitive closure (philosophy)">Cognitive closure (philosophy)</a></li>

<li><a href="Cognitive_neuroscience" title="Cognitive neuroscience">Cognitive neuroscience</a></li>

<li><a href="Connectionism" title="Connectionism">Connectionism</a></li>

<li><a href="Consciousness_in_animals" class="mw-redirect" title="Consciousness in animals">Consciousness in animals</a></li>

<li><a href="Downward_causation" title="Downward causation">Downward causation</a></li>

<li><i><a href="Descartes'_Error" title="Descartes' Error">Descartes' Error</a></i></li>

<li><a href="Embodied_cognition" title="Embodied cognition">Embodied cognition</a></li>

<li><a href="Existentialism" title="Existentialism">Existentialism</a></li>

<li><a href="Explanatory_gap" title="Explanatory gap">Explanatory gap</a></li>

<li><a href="Ideasthesia" title="Ideasthesia">Ideasthesia</a></li>

<li><a href="Namarupa" title="Namarupa">Namarupa</a> (Buddhist concept)</li>

<li><a href="Neuroscience_of_free_will" title="Neuroscience of free will">Neuroscience of free will</a></li>

<li><a href="Philosophical_zombie" title="Philosophical zombie">Philosophical zombie</a></li>

<li><a href="Philosophy_of_artificial_intelligence" title="Philosophy of artificial intelligence">Philosophy of artificial intelligence</a></li>

<li><a href="Pluralism_(philosophy)" title="Pluralism (philosophy)">Pluralism</a></li>

<li><a href="Problem_of_mental_causation" title="Problem of mental causation">Problem of mental causation</a></li>

<li><a href="Problem_of_other_minds" title="Problem of other minds">Problem of other minds</a></li>

<li><a href="Qualia" title="Qualia">Qualia</a></li>

<li><a href="Reductionism" title="Reductionism">Reductionism</a></li>

<li><a href="Sacred%E2%80%93profane_dichotomy" class="mw-redirect" title="Sacred–profane dichotomy">Sacred–profane dichotomy</a></li>

<li><a href="Sentience" title="Sentience">Sentience</a></li>

<li><a href="Strange_loop" title="Strange loop">Strange loop</a> (self-reflective thoughts)</li>

<li><i><a href="The_Mind's_I" title="The Mind's I">The Mind's I</a></i> (book on the subject)</li>

<li><a href="Turing_test" title="Turing test">Turing test</a></li>

<li><a href="Vertiginous_question" title="Vertiginous question">Vertiginous question</a></li>

<li><a href="William_H._Poteat" title="William H. Poteat">William H. Poteat</a></li></ul>

</div>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="References">References</h2></div>

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</style><cite class="citation book cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/">"Dualism"</a>. <i>The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i>. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 2020.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-Georgiev2020-2"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Georgiev2020_2-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFGeorgiev2020" class="citation journal cs1">Georgiev, Danko D. (2020). "Quantum information theoretic approach to the mind–brain problem". <i>Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology</i>. <b>158</b>: <span class="nowrap">16–</span>32. <a href="ArXiv_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ArXiv (identifier)">arXiv</a>:<span class="id-lock-free" title="Freely accessible"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2012.07836">2012.07836</a></span>. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1016%2Fj.pbiomolbio.2020.08.002">10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2020.08.002</a>. <a href="PMID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="PMID (identifier)">PMID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32822698">32822698</a>. <a href="S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:221237249">221237249</a>. <q>The mind-brain problem is to explain how the unobservable conscious mind and the observable brain relate to each other: do they interact or does one unilaterally generate the other?</q></cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-sep-mental-causation-3"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-sep-mental-causation_3-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFRobbHeil2009" class="citation encyclopaedia cs1">Robb, David; Heil, John (2009). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/mental-causation/">"Mental Causation"</a>. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). <i>The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i> (Summer 2009 ed.).</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-Northoff-4"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Northoff_4-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFGeorg_Northoff2004" class="citation book cs1">Georg Northoff (2004). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=CJq4QDixIg0C&pg=PT148"><i>Philosophy of the Brain: The Brain Problem</i></a> (Volume 52 of Advances in Consciousness Research ed.). John Benjamins Publishing. pp. <span class="nowrap">137–</span>139. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-1588114174</bdi>. <q>The restriction of causality to 'efficient causality' lead to the neglect of 'goal-orientation' since it was no longer necessary within [that] framework. Not considering 'goal-orientation' resulted in the neglect of 'embedment' and the consequential presupposition of 'isolation' with separation between brain, body, and environment. Neglecting 'embedment' lead to the equation of perception/action with sensory impression/movement which could be well accounted for by 'efficient causality'. Accordingly, since dominated by 'efficient causality', <a href="Qualia" title="Qualia">qualia</a> and intentionality, as related to perception/action rather than to sensory impression/movement, were excluded from science and consequently regarded [as] purely philosophical problems. Analogous to 'final causes', 'formal causes' were eliminated as well. 'Efficient causality' is not compatible with 'embedded coding' [which] is necessarily tied with 'formal causality' and 'final causality'... Finally, the possibility of mental causation remains incompatible with 'efficient causality'. It can, however, be properly described by 'formal and final causality'.</q></cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-Pockett-5"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Pockett_5-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFWalter_J_Freeman2009" class="citation book cs1">Walter J Freeman (2009). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=G5CaTnNksgkC&pg=PA4">"Consciousness, intentionality and causality"</a>. In Susan Pockett; WP Banks; Shaun Gallagher (eds.). <i>Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?</i>. MIT Press. pp. <span class="nowrap">4–</span>5, <span class="nowrap">88–</span>90. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0262512572</bdi>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-Kandel-6"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Kandel_6-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFEric_R._Kandel2007" class="citation book cs1">Eric R. Kandel (2007). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=PFnRwWXzypgC&pg=PA9"><i>In Search of Memory: The Emergence of a New Science of Mind</i></a>. WW Norton. p. 9. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0393329377</bdi>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-7"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-7">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFOswald_Hanfling2002" class="citation book cs1">Oswald Hanfling (2002). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=TRIkWPqy-JgC&pg=PA108"><i>Wittgenstein and the Human Form of Life</i></a>. Psychology Press. pp. <span class="nowrap">108–</span>109. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0415256452</bdi>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-Shear-8"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Shear_8-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">A term attributed to David Chalmers by <cite id="CITEREFEugene_O_Mills1999" class="citation book cs1">Eugene O Mills (1999). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=t4KNDxsj7fcC&pg=PA109">"Giving up on the hard problem of consciousness"</a>. In Jonathan Shear (ed.). <i>Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem</i>. MIT Press. p. 109. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0262692212</bdi>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-Goldenberg2008-9"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Goldenberg2008_9-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFGoldenberg2008" class="citation book cs1">Goldenberg, Georg (2008). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=zFP1AZYlNmcC&pg=PA136">"Chapter 7, How the Mind Moves the Body: Lessons From Apraxia"</a>. In Morsella, E.; Bargh, J.A.; Gollwitzer, P.M. (eds.). <i>Oxford Handbook of Human Action</i>. Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press, USA. p. 136. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>9780195309980</bdi>. <a href="LCCN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="LCCN (identifier)">LCCN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://lccn.loc.gov/2008004997">2008004997</a>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-10"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-10">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFGilder2009" class="citation book cs1">Gilder, L. (2009). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=5i4isqpu-I8C"><i>The Age of Entanglement: When Quantum Physics was Reborn</i></a>. Vintage Books. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-1-4000-9526-1</bdi><span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">November 11,</span> 2021</span>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-Koch2004p16-11"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Koch2004p16_11-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFChristof_Koch2004" class="citation book cs1">Christof Koch (2004). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=7L9qAAAAMAAJ&q=%22the+neuronal+correlates+of+consciousness%22">"Figure 1.1: Neuronal correlates of consciousness"</a>. <i>The Quest for Consciousness: A Neurobiological Approach</i>. Englewood, Colorado: Roberts & Company Publishers. p. 16. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0974707709</bdi>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-Koch2004p87-12"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Koch2004p87_12-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFChristof_Koch2004" class="citation book cs1">Christof Koch (2004). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=7L9qAAAAMAAJ&q=%22minimal+set+of+neural+events%22">"Chapter 5: What are the neuronal correlates of consciousness?"</a>. <i>The Quest for Consciousness: A Neurobiological Approach</i>. Englewood, Colorado: Roberts & Company Publishers. pp. xvi, 97, 104. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0974707709</bdi>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-13"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-13">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">See <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.klab.caltech.edu/~koch/glossary.html">here</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130313192029/http://www.klab.caltech.edu/~koch/glossary.html">Archived</a> 2013-03-13 at the <a href="Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a> for a glossary of related terms.</span>

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<li id="cite_note-Kandel2-14"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Kandel2_14-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFKandel,_Eric_R.2007" class="citation book cs1">Kandel, Eric R. (2007). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=PFnRwWXzypgC&pg=PA382"><i>In search of memory: The emergence of a new science of mind</i></a>. W. W. Norton & Company. p. 382. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0393329377</bdi>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-Churchland2002-15"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Churchland2002_15-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFChurchland2002" class="citation book cs1">Churchland, Patricia Smith (2002). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=vGY1BkA-gyYC&pg=PA476"><i>Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy</i></a>. Bradford Books. MIT Press. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>9780262532006</bdi>. <a href="LCCN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="LCCN (identifier)">LCCN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://lccn.loc.gov/2002066024">2002066024</a>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-Churchland1989-16"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Churchland1989_16-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFChurchland1989" class="citation book cs1">Churchland, Patricia Smith (1989). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=hAeFMFW3rDUC&pg=PA548"><i>Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind–Brain</i></a>. Computational Models of Cognition and Perception. MIT Press. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>9780262530859</bdi>. <a href="LCCN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="LCCN (identifier)">LCCN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://lccn.loc.gov/85023706">85023706</a>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-Churchland2007-17"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Churchland2007_17-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFChurchland2007" class="citation book cs1">Churchland, Paul (2007). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=ZeaS6XEga6wC"><i>Neurophilosophy at Work</i></a>. Cambridge University Press. pp. <span class="nowrap">viii–</span>ix. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>9780521864725</bdi>. <a href="LCCN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="LCCN (identifier)">LCCN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://lccn.loc.gov/2006014487">2006014487</a>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-Dennett1986-18"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Dennett1986_18-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFDennett1986" class="citation book cs1">Dennett, Daniel C. (1986). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=Sc1rzruVz2QC&pg=PA2"><i>Content and Consciousness</i></a>. International Library of Philosophy. Taylor \& Francis. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>9780415104319</bdi>. <a href="LCCN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="LCCN (identifier)">LCCN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://lccn.loc.gov/72436737">72436737</a>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-Dennett1997-19"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Dennett1997_19-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFDennett1997" class="citation book cs1">Dennett, Daniel C. (1997). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=nrtchsJKQeAC&pg=PA189"><i>Kinds of Minds: Toward an Understanding of Consciousness</i></a>. Science Masters Series. Basic Books. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>9780465073511</bdi>. <a href="LCCN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="LCCN (identifier)">LCCN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://lccn.loc.gov/96164655">96164655</a>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-20"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-20">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFSquire2008" class="citation book cs1"><a href="Larry_Squire" title="Larry Squire">Squire, Larry R.</a> (2008). <span class="id-lock-limited" title="Free access subject to limited trial, subscription normally required"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/details/fundamentalneuro00lrsq"><i>Fundamental neuroscience</i></a></span> (3rd ed.). <a href="Academic_Press" title="Academic Press">Academic Press</a>. p. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/details/fundamentalneuro00lrsq/page/n1243">1223</a>. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0-12-374019-9</bdi>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-21"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-21">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFAdamantidis_A.R.Zhang_F.Aravanis_A.M.Deisseroth_K.2007" class="citation journal cs1">Adamantidis A.R.; Zhang F.; Aravanis A.M.; Deisseroth K.; de Lecea L. (2007). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6744371">"Neural substrates of awakening probed with optogenetic control of hypocretin neurons"</a>. <i>Nature</i>. <b>450</b> (7168): <span class="nowrap">420–</span>4. <a href="Bibcode_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Bibcode (identifier)">Bibcode</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://ui.adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2007Natur.450..420A">2007Natur.450..420A</a>. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1038%2Fnature06310">10.1038/nature06310</a>. <a href="PMC_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="PMC (identifier)">PMC</a> <span class="id-lock-free" title="Freely accessible"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6744371">6744371</a></span>. <a href="PMID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="PMID (identifier)">PMID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17943086">17943086</a>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-Kochp91-22"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Kochp91_22-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFChristof_Koch2004" class="citation book cs1">Christof Koch (2004). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=7L9qAAAAMAAJ&q=%22The+Cholinergic+Enabling+System%22">"Figure 5.1 The Cholinergic Enabling System"</a>. <i>The Quest for Consciousness: A Neurobiological Approach</i>. Englewood, Colorado: Roberts & Company Publishers. p. 91. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0974707709</bdi>.</cite> Also see Chapter 5, available on line.</span>

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<li id="cite_note-23"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-23">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFZeman2001" class="citation journal cs1">Zeman, A. (2001). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1093%2Fbrain%2F124.7.1263">"Consciousness"</a>. <i>Brain</i>. <b>124</b> (7): <span class="nowrap">1263–</span>1289. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<span class="id-lock-free" title="Freely accessible"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1093%2Fbrain%2F124.7.1263">10.1093/brain/124.7.1263</a></span>. <a href="PMID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="PMID (identifier)">PMID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/11408323">11408323</a>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-24"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-24">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFSchiff2004" class="citation cs2">Schiff, Nicholas D. (November 2004), "The neurology of impaired consciousness: Challenges for cognitive neuroscience.", in <a href="Michael_Gazzaniga" title="Michael Gazzaniga">Gazzaniga, Michael S.</a> (ed.), <span class="id-lock-registration" title="Free registration required"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/details/cognitiveneurosc0000unse"><i>The Cognitive Neurosciences</i></a></span> (3rd ed.), MIT Press, <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0-262-07254-0</bdi></cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-25"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-25">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFChisholm1911" class="citation encyclopaedia cs1"><a href="Hugh_Chisholm" title="Hugh Chisholm">Chisholm, Hugh</a>, ed. (1911). <span class="cs1-ws-icon" title="s:1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Parallelism, Psychophysical"><a class="external text external" href="https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Parallelism,_Psychophysical">"Parallelism, Psychophysical" </a></span>. <i><a href="Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica_Eleventh_Edition" title="Encyclopædia Britannica Eleventh Edition">Encyclopædia Britannica</a></i>. Vol. 20 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 762.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-26"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-26">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">K. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, with some notes by R. Rojas.</span>

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<li id="cite_note-Turner-27"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Turner_27-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFBryan_S._Turner2008" class="citation book cs1">Bryan S. Turner (2008). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=FYKjzsc6SkAC"><i>The Body and Society: Explorations in Social Theory</i></a> (3rd ed.). Sage Publications. p. 78. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-1412929875</bdi>. <q>...a rejection of any dualism between mind and body, and a consequent insistence on the argument that the body is never simply a physical object but always an embodiment of consciousness.</q></cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-Aggregates-28"><span class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <a href="#cite_ref-Aggregates_28-0"><sup><i><b>a</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-Aggregates_28-1"><sup><i><b>b</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-Aggregates_28-2"><sup><i><b>c</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-Aggregates_28-3"><sup><i><b>d</b></i></sup></a></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFKarunamuni_N.D.2015" class="citation journal cs1">Karunamuni N.D. (May 2015). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F2158244015583860">"The Five-Aggregate Model of the Mind"</a>. <i>SAGE Open</i>. <b>5</b> (2): 215824401558386. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<span class="id-lock-free" title="Freely accessible"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F2158244015583860">10.1177/2158244015583860</a></span>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-29"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-29">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFList2023" class="citation web cs1">List, Christian (2023). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://philpapers.org/rec/LISTFA">"The first-personal argument against physicalism"</a><span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">7 February</span> 2025</span>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-30"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-30">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFList2023" class="citation web cs1">List, Christian (2023). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://philarchive.org/rec/LISAQF">"A quadrilemma for theories of consciousness"</a>. The Philosophical Quarterly<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">7 February</span> 2025</span>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-31"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-31">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFList2023" class="citation web cs1">List, Christian (2023). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://philarchive.org/rec/LISTMT-2">"The many-worlds theory of consciousness"</a>. The Philosophical Quarterly<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">7 February</span> 2025</span>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-:1-32"><span class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <a href="#cite_ref-:1_32-0"><sup><i><b>a</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-:1_32-1"><sup><i><b>b</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-:1_32-2"><sup><i><b>c</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-:1_32-3"><sup><i><b>d</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-:1_32-4"><sup><i><b>e</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-:1_32-5"><sup><i><b>f</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-:1_32-6"><sup><i><b>g</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-:1_32-7"><sup><i><b>h</b></i></sup></a></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFHergenhahn2009" class="citation book cs1">Hergenhahn, Baldwin R. (2009). <i>An Introduction to the History of Psychology, Sixth Edition</i>. Belmont, CA: Cengage Learning. p. 18. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0-495-50621-8</bdi>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-33"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-33">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFHergenhahn2009" class="citation book cs1">Hergenhahn, Baldwin R. (2009). <i>An Introduction to the History of Psychology, Sixth Edition</i>. Belmont, CA: Cengage Learning. pp. <span class="nowrap">121–</span>122. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0-495-50621-8</bdi>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-34"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-34">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite class="citation encyclopaedia cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/interactionism">"Interactionism Philosophy"</a>. <i>Encyclopaedia Britannica Online</i><span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">17 July</span> 2020</span>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-35"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-35">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFPopper1977" class="citation book cs1">Popper, Karl R. (1977). <i>The self and its brain: an argument for interactionism</i>. Springer International. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>0-415-05898-8</bdi>. <a href="OCLC_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="OCLC (identifier)">OCLC</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/oclc/180195035">180195035</a>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-36"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-36">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFEccles1994" class="citation cs2">Eccles, John C. (1994), "The Self and Its Brain: The Ultimate Synthesis", <i>How the SELF Controls Its BRAIN</i>, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. <span class="nowrap">167–</span>183, <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2F978-3-642-49224-2_10">10.1007/978-3-642-49224-2_10</a>, <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-3-642-49226-6</bdi></cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-Kim1-37"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Kim1_37-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFKim1995" class="citation book cs1">Kim, Jaegwan (1995). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=sI4YAAAAIAAJ&q=editions:qiO-uKvXxpQC">"Emergent properties"</a>. In Honderich, Ted (ed.). <i>Oxford Companion to Philosophy</i>. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 240. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>9780198661320</bdi>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-PsyBio-38"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-PsyBio_38-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFPinel,_J.2009" class="citation book cs1">Pinel, J. (2009). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=eW1FAQAAIAAJ"><i>Psychobiology</i></a> (7th ed.). Pearson/Allyn and Bacon. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0205548927</bdi>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-LeDoux-39"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-LeDoux_39-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFLeDoux,_J.2002" class="citation book cs1">LeDoux, J. (2002). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=3Zpr6NOy5tsC"><i>The Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are</i></a>. Viking Penguin. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-88-7078-795-5</bdi>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-RussNor-40"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-RussNor_40-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFRussell,_S.Norvig,_P.2010" class="citation book cs1">Russell, S. & Norvig, P. (2010). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=8jZBksh-bUMC"><i>Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach</i></a> (3rd ed.). Prentice Hall. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0136042594</bdi>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-DawkRich-41"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-DawkRich_41-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFDawkins,_R.2006" class="citation book cs1">Dawkins, R. (2006). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=0ICKantUfvoC"><i>The Selfish Gene</i></a> (3rd ed.). Oxford University Press. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0199291144</bdi>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-42"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-42">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFElitzur2009" class="citation journal cs1">Elitzur, Avshalom (2009). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://philarchive.org/rec/ELICMA">"Consciousness makes a difference: A reluctant dualist's confession"</a>. <i>Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness</i><span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">24 January</span> 2025</span>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-43"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-43">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFWalter" class="citation web cs1">Walter, Sven. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.iep.utm.edu/epipheno/#H2">"Epiphenomenalism"</a>. <i>Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i>. University of Bielefeld<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">17 July</span> 2020</span>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-44"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-44">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFBroad2014" class="citation book cs1">Broad, C.D. (2014-06-03). <i>The Mind and its Place in Nature</i>. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.4324%2F9781315824147">10.4324/9781315824147</a>. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>9781315824147</bdi>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-45"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-45">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFHergenhahn2013" class="citation book cs1">Hergenhahn, Baldwin R. (2013). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=6-FchL0K_ioC&q=psychophysics&pg=PA240"><i>An Introduction to the History of Psychology, Seventh Edition</i></a>. Cengage Learning. pp. <span class="nowrap">240–</span>241. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-1-133-95809-3</bdi>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-46"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-46">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFLeibniz,_Gottfried_Wilhelm.2016" class="citation book cs1">Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. (2016). <i>La Monadologie</i>. BnF-P. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-2-346-03192-4</bdi>. <a href="OCLC_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="OCLC (identifier)">OCLC</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/oclc/1041048644">1041048644</a>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-47"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-47">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFHergenhahn2009" class="citation book cs1">Hergenhahn, Baldwin R. (2009). <i>An Introduction to the History of Psychology, Sixth Edition</i>. Belmont, CA: Cengage Learning. pp. <span class="nowrap">186–</span>188. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0-495-50621-8</bdi>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-48"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-48">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><i>Leibniz Philosophischen Schriften</i> hrsg. C. Gerhardt, Bd VI 539, 546; and also the <i><a href="New_Essays_on_Human_Understanding" title="New Essays on Human Understanding">New Essays</a></i></span>

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<li id="cite_note-49"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-49">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFPorter2010" class="citation book cs1">Porter, Burton (2010). <i>What the Tortoise Taught Us: The Story of Philosophy</i>. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. p. 133.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-50"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-50">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFCuttingham2013" class="citation journal cs1">Cuttingham, John (June 1, 2013). <span class="id-lock-subscription" title="Paid subscription required"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://academic.oup.com/aristoteliansupp/article/87/1/259/1774803">"II—John Cottingham: Descartes and Darwin: Reflections on the Sixth Meditation"</a></span> <span class="cs1-format">(pdf)</span>. <i>Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume</i>. <b>87</b> (1). Oxford University Press: 268. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-8349.2013.00229.x">10.1111/j.1467-8349.2013.00229.x</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0309-7013">0309-7013</a>. <a href="OCLC_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="OCLC (identifier)">OCLC</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/oclc/5884450451">5884450451</a><span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">April 30,</span> 2021</span>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-:2-51"><span class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <a href="#cite_ref-:2_51-0"><sup><i><b>a</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-:2_51-1"><sup><i><b>b</b></i></sup></a></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFHergenhahn2009" class="citation book cs1">Hergenhahn, Baldwin R. (2009). <i>An Introduction to the History of Psychology, Sixth Edition</i>. Belmont, CA: Cengage Learning. p. 185. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0-495-50621-8</bdi>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-Young-52"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Young_52-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFRobert_M._Young1996" class="citation book cs1">Robert M. Young (1996). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://human-nature.com/rmyoung/papers/pap102h.html">"The mind–body problem"</a>. In RC Olby; GN Cantor; JR Christie; MJS Hodges (eds.). <i>Companion to the History of Modern Science</i> (Paperback reprint of Routledge 1990 ed.). Taylor and Francis. pp. <span class="nowrap">702–</span>11. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0415145787</bdi>. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20070614061431/http://human-nature.com/rmyoung/papers/pap102h.html">Archived</a> from the original on 2007-06-14.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-Robinson-53"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Robinson_53-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFRobinson,_Howard2011" class="citation encyclopaedia cs1">Robinson, Howard (Nov 3, 2011). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/dualism/">"Dualism"</a>. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). <i>The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition)</i>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-Lagerlund-54"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Lagerlund_54-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFHenrik_Lagerlund2010" class="citation book cs1">Henrik Lagerlund (2010). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=IV-dcQAACAAJ">"Introduction"</a>. In Henrik Lagerlund (ed.). <i>Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment</i> (Paperback reprint of 2007 ed.). <a href="Springer_Science%2BBusiness_Media" title="Springer Science+Business Media">Springer Science+Business Media</a>. p. 3. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-9048175307</bdi>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-55"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-55">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.067.than.html">Nalakalapiyo Sutta: Sheaves of Reeds</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160503051913/http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.067.than.html">Archived</a> 2016-05-03 at the <a href="Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a></span>

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<li id="cite_note-56"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-56">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an04/an04.045.than.html">Rohitassa Sutta: To Rohitassa</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110512204617/http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an04/an04.045.than.html">Archived</a> 2011-05-12 at the <a href="Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a></span>

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<li id="cite_note-57"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-57">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/study/khandha.html">The Five Aggregates: A Study Guide</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20020917193707/http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/study/khandha.html">Archived</a> 2002-09-17 at the <a href="Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a></span>

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<li id="cite_note-58"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-58">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.002.than.html">Sabbasava Sutta: All the Fermentations</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20060625214552/http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.002.than.html">Archived</a> 2006-06-25 at the <a href="Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a></span>

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<li id="cite_note-59"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-59">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFNelson2005" class="citation book cs1">Nelson, Alan, ed. (2005). "A Companion to Rationalism". Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. pp. <span class="nowrap">xiv–</span>xvi. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fb.9781405109093.2005.00003.x">10.1111/b.9781405109093.2005.00003.x</a> (inactive 1 July 2025). <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-1-4051-0909-3</bdi>.</cite> <span class="cs1-visible-error citation-comment"><code class="cs1-code">{{cite book}}</code>: </span><span class="cs1-visible-error citation-comment">Missing or empty <code class="cs1-code">|title=</code> (help)</span><span class="cs1-maint citation-comment">CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of July 2025 (link)</span></span>

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<li id="cite_note-60"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-60">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><a href="#CITEREFGendlin2012b">Gendlin 2012b</a>, p. 121–122<div align="left">432a1-2</div><div align="right"><b>Hence</b> the soul is <b>as</b> the hand is; <b>for<br>the hand is a tool of tools</b>, and<br><b>the nous is a form of forms</b><br>(<span title="Ancient Greek (to 1453)-language text"><span lang="grc">ὥστε ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ ἡ χείρ ἐστιν· καὶ γὰρ η χεὶρ ὄργανόν<br>ἐστιν ὀργάνων</span></span>)</div><br> Aristotle now lets this aspect of nous and hand define a new term which he does not use anywhere else, so far as I know. The hand is “a tool of tools.” The nous is a “form of forms.” The hand and the soul are unique in this respect. Let us see further what this means.<br>

<p>Aristotle seems to say that the nous is a form, but on closer inspection we find that it is not, or at least not the usual kind. Nous is a maker of forms. A “form of forms” is like a tool of tools, like a living body's organ that makes tools. Nous is certainly not itself the sort of form that it makes. The hand is not a made tool (it would have to be made by yet another hand).<br><b>In Greek “tool” and “organ” are the same word. So we see: ”In the phrase “tool of tools” the first use of the word stands for a living organ, the second for an artificially made tool.</b> In II-4 he says “all natural bodies are tools (organs) of the soul's,” (both as food and as material from which to make tools). In English we would say that the <b>hand is the organ of tools.</b>

</p>

</span></li>

<li id="cite_note-61"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-61">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><a href="#CITEREFHicks1907">Hicks 1907</a>, <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/stream/aristotledeanima005947mbp#page/n629/mode/2up">p. 542</a><br> <b>431b230–432a14.</b> To sum up: the soul is in a manner the universe of things, which is made up of things sensible and things intelligible: and knowledge is in a manner identical with its object, the intelligible; sense with its object, the sensible. This statement calls for further explanation. Sense and knowledge, whether potential or actual, are distributed over things potential or actual, as the case may be. In the soul, again, the sensitive faculty and the cognitive faculty are potentially their respective objects. These objects must therefore exist in the soul, not indeed as concrete wholes, form and matter combined, which is impossible: it must be the <i>forms</i> of things which exist in the soul. Thus within the soul intellect is the form of forms, i.e. of intelligible forms, and sense the form of sensibles, precisely as in the body the hand is the instrument of instruments, i.e. the instrument by which other instruments are acquired.</span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-Shields-62"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Shields_62-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFShields,_Christopher2011" class="citation encyclopaedia cs1">Shields, Christopher (2011). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/aristotle-psychology/">"Aristotle's Psychology"</a>. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). <i>The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition)</i>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-63"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-63">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFMcInernyO'Callaghan2018" class="citation journal cs1">McInerny, Ralph; O'Callaghan, John (Summer 2018). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/aquinas/">"Saint Thomas Aquinas"</a>. <i>The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i><span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">7 November</span> 2018</span>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-64"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-64">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/galen.html">Researchgate:Galen and the tripartite soul</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170531173126/http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/galen.html">Archived</a> 2017-05-31 at the <a href="Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-65"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-65">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/galen.html">Early Christian writings:Galen</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170531173126/http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/galen.html">Archived</a> 2017-05-31 at the <a href="Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-Lokhorst-66"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Lokhorst_66-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFLokhorst,_Gert-Jan2008" class="citation encyclopaedia cs1">Lokhorst, Gert-Jan (Nov 5, 2008). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/pineal-gland/">"Descartes and the Pineal Gland"</a>. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). <i>The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition)</i>.</cite> Lokhorst quotes Descartes in his <i>Treatise of Man</i></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-Lokhorst1-67"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Lokhorst1_67-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFLokhorst,_Gert-Jan2008" class="citation encyclopaedia cs1">Lokhorst, Gert-Jan (Nov 5, 2008). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/pineal-gland/">"Descartes and the Pineal Gland"</a>. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). <i>The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition)</i>.</cite> Lokhorst quotes Descartes in his <i>Passions of the Soul</i></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-Brook-68"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Brook_68-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFBrook,_Andrew2008" class="citation encyclopaedia cs1"><a href="Andrew_Brook" title="Andrew Brook">Brook, Andrew</a> (October 20, 2008). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/kant-mind/">"Kant's View of the Mind and Consciousness of Self"</a>. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). <i>The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition)</i>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-Watkins-69"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Watkins_69-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFEric_Watkins2004" class="citation book cs1">Eric Watkins (2004). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=XIIsaGoHshoC&pg=PA108">"Causality in context"</a>. <i>Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality</i>. Cambridge University Press. p. 108. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0521543613</bdi>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-Robinson2-70"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Robinson2_70-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFRobinson,_William2011" class="citation encyclopaedia cs1">Robinson, William (January 27, 2011). <span class="id-lock-subscription" title="Paid subscription required"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/epiphenomenalism/">"Epiphenomenalism"</a></span>. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). <i>The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition)</i>. Vol. 1. pp. <span class="nowrap">539–</span>547. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1002%2Fwcs.19">10.1002/wcs.19</a>. <a href="PMID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="PMID (identifier)">PMID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26271501">26271501</a>. <a href="S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:239938469">239938469</a>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-71"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-71">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">See, e.g., Ronny Desmet and <a href="Michel_Weber" title="Michel Weber">Michel Weber</a> (edited by), <i><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.academia.edu/279940/Whitehead._The_Algebra_of_Metaphysics">Whitehead. The Algebra of Metaphysics. Applied Process Metaphysics Summer Institute Memorandum</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170727230542/http://www.academia.edu/279940/Whitehead._The_Algebra_of_Metaphysics">Archived</a> 2017-07-27 at the <a href="Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a></i>, Louvain-la-Neuve, Éditions Chromatika, 2010 (<a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-2-930517-08-7</bdi>).</span>

</li>

<cite id="CITEREFKarl_Raimund_Popper1999" class="citation book cs1">Karl Raimund Popper (1999). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=Pa3cZYwdq28C&pg=PA269">"Notes of a realist on the body–mind problem"</a>. <i>All Life is Problem Solving</i> (A lecture given in Mannheim, 8 May 1972 ed.). Psychology Press. pp. 29 <i>ff</i>. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0415174862</bdi>. <q>The body–mind relationship...includes the problem of man's position in the physical world...'World 1'. The world of conscious human processes I shall call 'World 2', and the world of the objective creations of the human mind I shall call 'World 3'.</q></cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-73"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-73">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFTanney2007" class="citation web cs1">Tanney, Julia (December 18, 2007). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ryle/">"Gilbert Ryle"</a>. <i>Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i><span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">May 2,</span> 2021</span>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-Searle-74"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Searle_74-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFJoshua_Rust2009" class="citation book cs1">Joshua Rust (2009). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=9CWdaJq-apUC&pg=PA28"><i>John Searle</i></a>. Continuum International Publishing Group. pp. <span class="nowrap">27–</span>28. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0826497529</bdi>.</cite></span>

</li>

</ol></div>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Bibliography">Bibliography</h2></div>

<ul><li><cite id="CITEREFBunge2014" class="citation book cs1"><a href="Mario_Bunge" title="Mario Bunge">Bunge, Mario</a> (2014). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=AnKoBQAAQBAJ"><i>The Mind–Body Problem: A Psychobiological Approach</i></a>. Elsevier. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-1-4831-5012-3</bdi>.</cite></li>

<li><cite id="CITEREFFeigl1958" class="citation book cs1">Feigl, Herbert (1958). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://ditext.com./feigl/mp/mp.html">"The 'Mental' and the 'Physical'"</a>. In Feigl, Herbert; Scriven, Michael; Maxwell, Grover (eds.). <i>Concepts, Theories, and the Mind–Body Problem</i>. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 2. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. pp. <span class="nowrap">370–</span>457.</cite></li>

<li><cite id="CITEREFGendlin2012a" class="citation web cs1"><a href="Eugene_Gendlin" title="Eugene Gendlin">Gendlin, E. T.</a> (2012a). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.focusing.org/aristotle/Ae_Bk_1-2.pdf">"Line by Line translation on Aristotle's De Anima, Books I and II"</a> <span class="cs1-format">(PDF)</span>.</cite></li>

<li><cite id="CITEREFGendlin2012b" class="citation web cs1"><a href="Eugene_Gendlin" title="Eugene Gendlin">Gendlin, E. T.</a> (2012b). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.focusing.org/aristotle/Ae_Bk_3.pdf">"Line by Line translation on Aristotle's De Anima, Book III"</a> <span class="cs1-format">(PDF)</span>.</cite></li>

<li><cite id="CITEREFHicks1907" class="citation book cs1"><a href="Robert_Drew_Hicks" title="Robert Drew Hicks">Hicks, R. D.</a> (1907). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/stream/aristotledeanima005947mbp"><i>Aristotle, De Anima</i></a>. <a href="Cambridge_University_Press" title="Cambridge University Press">Cambridge University Press</a>.</cite></li>

<li>Kim, J. (1995). "Mind–Body Problem", <i>Oxford Companion to Philosophy</i>. Ted Honderich (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.</li>

<li><cite id="CITEREFJaegwon_Kim2010" class="citation book cs1">Jaegwon Kim (2010). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=Ms6gBG-o65MC"><i>Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind</i></a>. Oxford University Press. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0-19-162506-0</bdi>.</cite></li>

<li>Massimini, M.; Tononi, G. (2018). Sizing up Consciousness: Towards an Objective Measure of the Capacity for Experience. Oxford University Press.</li>

<li><a href="Bryan_S._Turner_(sociologist)" class="mw-redirect" title="Bryan S. Turner (sociologist)">Turner, Bryan S.</a> (1996). <i><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=K_8WxOqOWtMC">The Body and Society: Exploration in Social Theory</a></i>.</li></ul>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="External_links">External links</h2></div>

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</div>

<ul><li><span class="noviewer" typeof="mw:File"></span> <a href="https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Consciousness_Studies" class="extiw external" title="wikibooks:Consciousness Studies">Consciousness Studies</a> at Wikibooks</li>

<li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/plato-metaphysics/">Plato's Middle Period Metaphysics and Epistemology - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a></li>

<li><cite id="CITEREFRobert_M._Young1996" class="citation book cs1">Robert M. Young (1996). "The mind–body problem". In RC Olby; GN Cantor; JR Christie; MJS Hodges (eds.). <i>Companion to the History of Modern Science</i> (Paperback reprint of Routledge 1990 ed.). Taylor and Francis. pp. <span class="nowrap">702–</span>11. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0415145787</bdi>.</cite></li>

<li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p003k9b8">The Mind/Body Problem</a>, BBC Radio 4 discussion with Anthony Grayling, Julian Baggini & Sue James (<i>In Our Time</i>, Jan. 13, 2005)</li></ul>

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</style></div><div role="navigation" class="navbox" aria-labelledby="Consciousness277" style="padding:3px"><table class="nowraplinks hlist mw-collapsible autocollapse navbox-inner" style="border-spacing:0;background:transparent;color:inherit"><tbody><tr><th scope="col" class="navbox-title" colspan="2"><div id="Consciousness277" style="font-size:114%;margin:0 4em"><a href="Consciousness" title="Consciousness">Consciousness</a></div></th></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Figures</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em"></div><table class="nowraplinks navbox-subgroup" style="border-spacing:0"><tbody><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Philosophy</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Alfred_North_Whitehead" title="Alfred North Whitehead">Alfred North Whitehead</a></li>

<li><a href="Arthur_Schopenhauer" title="Arthur Schopenhauer">Arthur Schopenhauer</a></li>

<li><a href="Baruch_Spinoza" title="Baruch Spinoza">Baruch Spinoza</a></li>

<li><a href="Bertrand_Russell" title="Bertrand Russell">Bertrand Russell</a></li>

<li><a href="Brian_O'Shaughnessy_(philosopher)" title="Brian O'Shaughnessy (philosopher)">Brian O'Shaughnessy</a></li>

<li><a href="Charles_Augustus_Strong" title="Charles Augustus Strong">Charles Augustus Strong</a></li>

<li><a href="Christopher_Peacocke" title="Christopher Peacocke">Christopher Peacocke</a></li>

<li><a href="Colin_McGinn" title="Colin McGinn">Colin McGinn</a></li>

<li><a href="Daniel_Dennett" title="Daniel Dennett">Daniel Dennett</a></li>

<li><a href="David_Chalmers" title="David Chalmers">David Chalmers</a></li>

<li><a href="David_Hume" title="David Hume">David Hume</a></li>

<li><a href="David_Papineau" title="David Papineau">David Papineau</a></li>

<li><a href="David_Pearce_(philosopher)" title="David Pearce (philosopher)">David Pearce</a></li>

<li><a href="Donald_Davidson_(philosopher)" title="Donald Davidson (philosopher)">Donald Davidson</a></li>

<li><a href="Douglas_Hofstadter" title="Douglas Hofstadter">Douglas Hofstadter</a></li>

<li><a href="Edmund_Husserl" title="Edmund Husserl">Edmund Husserl</a></li>

<li><a href="Frank_Cameron_Jackson" title="Frank Cameron Jackson">Frank Jackson</a></li>

<li><a href="Fred_Dretske" title="Fred Dretske">Fred Dretske</a></li>

<li><a href="Galen_Strawson" title="Galen Strawson">Galen Strawson</a></li>

<li><a href="George_Berkeley" title="George Berkeley">George Berkeley</a></li>

<li><a href="George_Henry_Lewes" title="George Henry Lewes">George Henry Lewes</a></li>

<li><a href="Georges_Rey" title="Georges Rey">Georges Rey</a></li>

<li><a href="Gottfried_Wilhelm_Leibniz" title="Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz">Gottfried Leibniz</a></li>

<li><a href="Immanuel_Kant" title="Immanuel Kant">Immanuel Kant</a></li>

<li><a href="John_Eccles_(neurophysiologist)" title="John Eccles (neurophysiologist)">John Eccles</a></li>

<li><a href="John_Locke" title="John Locke">John Locke</a></li>

<li><a href="John_Polkinghorne" title="John Polkinghorne">John Polkinghorne</a></li>

<li><a href="John_Searle" title="John Searle">John Searle</a></li>

<li><a href="Joseph_Levine_(philosopher)" title="Joseph Levine (philosopher)">Joseph Levine</a></li>

<li><a href="Karl_Popper" title="Karl Popper">Karl Popper</a></li>

<li><a href="Keith_Frankish" title="Keith Frankish">Keith Frankish</a></li>

<li><a href="Kenneth_M._Sayre" title="Kenneth M. Sayre">Kenneth M. Sayre</a></li>

<li><a href="Maurice_Merleau-Ponty" title="Maurice Merleau-Ponty">Maurice Merleau-Ponty</a></li>

<li><a href="Max_Velmans" title="Max Velmans">Max Velmans</a></li>

<li><a href="Michael_Tye_(philosopher)" title="Michael Tye (philosopher)">Michael Tye</a></li>

<li><a href="Martin_Heidegger" title="Martin Heidegger">Martin Heidegger</a></li>

<li><a href="Ned_Block" title="Ned Block">Ned Block</a></li>

<li><a href="Patricia_Churchland" title="Patricia Churchland">Patricia Churchland</a></li>

<li><a href="Paul_Churchland" title="Paul Churchland">Paul Churchland</a></li>

<li><a href="Philip_Goff_(philosopher)" title="Philip Goff (philosopher)">Philip Goff</a></li>

<li><a href="Ren%C3%A9_Descartes" title="René Descartes">René Descartes</a></li>

<li><a href="Thomas_Metzinger" title="Thomas Metzinger">Thomas Metzinger</a></li>

<li><a href="Thomas_Nagel" title="Thomas Nagel">Thomas Nagel</a></li>

<li><a href="William_Kingdon_Clifford" title="William Kingdon Clifford">William Kingdon Clifford</a></li>

<li><a href="William_Lycan" title="William Lycan">William Lycan</a></li>

<li><a href="William_Seager_(philosopher)" title="William Seager (philosopher)">William Seager</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Psychology</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Carl_Jung" title="Carl Jung">Carl Gustav Jung</a></li>

<li><a href="Donald_D._Hoffman" title="Donald D. Hoffman">Donald D. Hoffman</a></li>

<li><a href="Franz_Brentano" title="Franz Brentano">Franz Brentano</a></li>

<li><a href="Gustav_Fechner" title="Gustav Fechner">Gustav Fechner</a></li>

<li><a href="Julian_Jaynes" title="Julian Jaynes">Julian Jaynes</a></li>

<li><a href="Kurt_Koffka" title="Kurt Koffka">Kurt Koffka</a></li>

<li><a href="Max_Wertheimer" title="Max Wertheimer">Max Wertheimer</a></li>

<li><a href="Sigmund_Freud" title="Sigmund Freud">Sigmund Freud</a></li>

<li><a href="Wilhelm_Wundt" title="Wilhelm Wundt">Wilhelm Wundt</a></li>

<li><a href="William_James" title="William James">William James</a></li>

<li><a href="Wolfgang_K%C3%B6hler" title="Wolfgang Köhler">Wolfgang Köhler</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Neuroscience</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<li><a href="Antonio_Damasio" title="Antonio Damasio">Antonio Damasio</a></li>

<li><a href="Benjamin_Libet" title="Benjamin Libet">Benjamin Libet</a></li>

<li><a href="Bernard_Baars" title="Bernard Baars">Bernard Baars</a></li>

<li><a href="Christof_Koch" title="Christof Koch">Christof Koch</a></li>

<li><a href="Francis_Crick" title="Francis Crick">Francis Crick</a></li>

<li><a href="Francisco_Varela" title="Francisco Varela">Francisco Varela</a></li>

<li><a href="Gerald_Edelman" title="Gerald Edelman">Gerald Edelman</a></li>

<li><a href="Giulio_Tononi" title="Giulio Tononi">Giulio Tononi</a></li>

<li><a href="Karl_H._Pribram" title="Karl H. Pribram">Karl Pribram</a></li>

<li><a href="Lawrence_Weiskrantz" title="Lawrence Weiskrantz">Lawrence Weiskrantz</a></li>

<li><a href="Michael_Gazzaniga" title="Michael Gazzaniga">Michael Gazzaniga</a></li>

<li><a href="Michael_Graziano" title="Michael Graziano">Michael Graziano</a></li>

<li><a href="Patrick_Wilken" title="Patrick Wilken">Patrick Wilken</a></li>

<li><a href="Roger_Wolcott_Sperry" title="Roger Wolcott Sperry">Roger Sperry</a></li>

<li><a href="Stanislas_Dehaene" title="Stanislas Dehaene">Stanislas Dehaene</a></li>

<li><a href="Steven_Laureys" title="Steven Laureys">Steven Laureys</a></li>

<li><a href="Stuart_Hameroff" title="Stuart Hameroff">Stuart Hameroff</a></li>

<li><a href="Wolf_Singer" title="Wolf Singer">Wolf Singer</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Others</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Annaka_Harris" title="Annaka Harris">Annaka Harris</a></li>

<li><a href="David_Bohm" title="David Bohm">David Bohm</a></li>

<li><a href="Eugene_Wigner" title="Eugene Wigner">Eugene Wigner</a></li>

<li><a href="Erwin_Schr%C3%B6dinger" title="Erwin Schrödinger">Erwin Schrödinger</a></li>

<li><a href="Marvin_Minsky" title="Marvin Minsky">Marvin Minsky</a></li>

<li><a href="Max_Planck" title="Max Planck">Max Planck</a></li>

<li><a href="Roger_Penrose" title="Roger Penrose">Roger Penrose</a></li>

<li><a href="Susan_Blackmore" title="Susan Blackmore">Susan Blackmore</a></li>

<li><a href="Victor_J._Stenger" title="Victor J. Stenger">Victor J. Stenger</a></li>

<li><a href="Wolfgang_Pauli" title="Wolfgang Pauli">Wolfgang Pauli</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr></tbody></table><div></div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Theories</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em"></div><table class="nowraplinks navbox-subgroup" style="border-spacing:0"><tbody><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%"><a href="Philosophy_of_mind" title="Philosophy of mind">Philosophy of mind</a></th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Anomalous_monism" title="Anomalous monism">Anomalous monism</a></li>

<li><a href="Computational_theory_of_mind" title="Computational theory of mind">Computationalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Double-aspect_theory" title="Double-aspect theory">Double-aspect theory</a></li>

<li><a href="Eliminative_materialism" title="Eliminative materialism">Eliminative materialism</a></li>

<li><a href="Emergentism" title="Emergentism">Emergentism</a></li>

<li><a href="Epiphenomenalism" title="Epiphenomenalism">Epiphenomenalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind)" title="Functionalism (philosophy of mind)">Functionalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Idealism" title="Idealism">Idealism</a></li>

<li><a href="Interactionism_(philosophy_of_mind)" title="Interactionism (philosophy of mind)">Interactionism</a></li>

<li><a href="Materialism" title="Materialism">Materialism</a></li>

<li><a href="Mind%E2%80%93body_dualism" title="Mind–body dualism">Mind–body dualism</a></li>

<li><a href="Monism" title="Monism">Monism</a></li>

<li><a href="Neutral_monism" title="Neutral monism">Neutral monism</a></li>

<li><a href="New_mysterianism" title="New mysterianism">New mysterianism</a></li>

<li><a href="Nondualism" title="Nondualism">Nondualism</a></li>

<li><a href="Panpsychism" title="Panpsychism">Panpsychism</a></li>

<li><a href="Psychophysical_parallelism" title="Psychophysical parallelism">Parallelism</a></li>

<li><a href="Physicalism" title="Physicalism">Physicalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Property_dualism" title="Property dualism">Property dualism</a></li>

<li><a href="Reflexive_monism" title="Reflexive monism">Reflexive monism</a></li>

<li><a href="Revisionary_materialism" class="mw-redirect" title="Revisionary materialism">Revisionary materialism</a></li>

<li><a href="Solipsism" title="Solipsism">Solipsism</a></li>

<li><a href="Type_physicalism" title="Type physicalism">Type physicalism (reductive materialism, identity theory)</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Science</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Attention_schema_theory" title="Attention schema theory">Attention schema theory</a></li>

<li><a href="Consciousness_causes_collapse" title="Consciousness causes collapse">Consciousness causes collapse</a></li>

<li><a href="A_Universe_of_Consciousness#The_Dynamic_Core_Hypothesis" title="A Universe of Consciousness">Dynamic core hypothesis</a></li>

<li><a href="Damasio's_theory_of_consciousness" title="Damasio's theory of consciousness">Damasio's theory of consciousness</a></li>

<li><a href="Electromagnetic_theories_of_consciousness" title="Electromagnetic theories of consciousness">Electromagnetic theories of consciousness</a></li>

<li><a href="Global_workspace_theory" title="Global workspace theory">Global workspace theory</a></li>

<li><a href="Higher-order_theories_of_consciousness" title="Higher-order theories of consciousness">Higher-order theories of consciousness</a></li>

<li><a href="Holonomic_brain_theory" title="Holonomic brain theory">Holonomic brain theory</a></li>

<li><a href="Integrated_information_theory" title="Integrated information theory">Integrated information theory</a></li>

<li><a href="Visual_masking#Lamme's_recurrent_feedback_hypothesis_of_visual_awareness_and_masking" title="Visual masking">Lamme's recurrent feedback hypothesis</a></li>

<li><a href="Multiple_drafts_model" title="Multiple drafts model">Multiple drafts model</a></li>

<li><a href="Orchestrated_objective_reduction" title="Orchestrated objective reduction">Orchestrated objective reduction</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr></tbody></table><div></div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Topics</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Agnosia" title="Agnosia">Agnosia</a></li>

<li><a href="Altered_state_of_consciousness" title="Altered state of consciousness">Altered state of consciousness</a></li>

<li><a href="Animal_consciousness" title="Animal consciousness">Animal consciousness</a></li>

<li><a href="Artificial_consciousness" title="Artificial consciousness">Artificial consciousness</a></li>

<li><a href="Attention" title="Attention">Attention</a>

<ul><li><a href="Attentional_control" title="Attentional control">Attentional control</a></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Awareness" title="Awareness">Awareness</a></li>

<li><a href="Binding_problem" title="Binding problem">Binding problem</a></li>

<li><a href="Binocular_rivalry" title="Binocular rivalry">Binocular rivalry</a></li>

<li><a href="Blindsight" title="Blindsight">Blindsight</a></li>

<li><a href="Brain" title="Brain">Brain</a></li>

<li><a href="Cartesian_theater" title="Cartesian theater">Cartesian theater</a></li>

<li><a href="Consciousness_after_death" class="mw-redirect" title="Consciousness after death">Consciousness after death</a></li>

<li><a href="Disorders_of_consciousness" class="mw-redirect" title="Disorders of consciousness">Disorders of consciousness</a></li>

<li><a href="Divided_consciousness" class="mw-redirect" title="Divided consciousness">Divided consciousness</a></li>

<li><a href="Dual_consciousness" title="Dual consciousness">Dual consciousness (split-brain)</a></li>

<li><a href="Experience" title="Experience">Experience</a></li>

<li><a href="Explanatory_gap" title="Explanatory gap">Explanatory gap</a></li>

<li><a href="Flash_suppression" title="Flash suppression">Flash suppression</a></li>

<li><a href="Hallucination" title="Hallucination">Hallucination</a></li>

<li><a href="Hard_problem_of_consciousness" title="Hard problem of consciousness">Hard problem of consciousness</a></li>

<li><a href="Heterophenomenology" title="Heterophenomenology">Heterophenomenology</a></li>

<li><a href="Higher_consciousness" title="Higher consciousness">Higher consciousness</a></li>

<li><a href="Illusion" title="Illusion">Illusion</a></li>

<li><a href="Introspection_illusion" title="Introspection illusion">Introspection illusion</a></li>

<li><a href="Knowledge_argument" title="Knowledge argument">Knowledge argument</a></li>

<li><a href="Locked-in_syndrome" title="Locked-in syndrome">Locked-in syndrome</a></li>

<li><a href="Minimally_conscious_state" title="Minimally conscious state">Minimally conscious state</a></li>

<li><a href="Neural_correlates_of_consciousness" title="Neural correlates of consciousness">Neural correlates of consciousness</a></li>

<li><a href="Neurophenomenology" title="Neurophenomenology">Neurophenomenology</a></li>

<li><a href="Ontology" title="Ontology">Ontology</a></li>

<li><a href="Phenomenology_(philosophy)" title="Phenomenology (philosophy)">Phenomenology</a></li>

<li><a href="Philosophical_zombie" title="Philosophical zombie">Philosophical zombie</a></li>

<li><a href="Philosophy_of_mind" title="Philosophy of mind">Philosophy of mind</a></li>

<li><a href="Primary_consciousness" title="Primary consciousness">Primary consciousness</a></li>

<li><a href="Problem_of_other_minds" title="Problem of other minds">Problem of other minds</a></li>

<li><a href="Qualia" title="Qualia">Qualia</a></li>

<li><a href="Quantum_mind" title="Quantum mind">Quantum mind</a></li>

<li><a href="Reentry_(neural_circuitry)" title="Reentry (neural circuitry)">Reentry</a></li>

<li><a href="Sakshi_(witness)" title="Sakshi (witness)">Sakshi</a>

<ul><li><i><a href="Purusha" title="Purusha">Purusha</a></i></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Secondary_consciousness" title="Secondary consciousness">Secondary consciousness</a></li>

<li><a href="Sentience" title="Sentience">Sentience</a></li>

<li><a href="Sentientism" title="Sentientism">Sentientism</a></li>

<li><a href="Sociology_of_human_consciousness" title="Sociology of human consciousness">Sociology of human consciousness</a></li>

<li><a href="Stream_of_consciousness_(psychology)" title="Stream of consciousness (psychology)">Stream of consciousness</a></li>

<li><a href="Subconscious" title="Subconscious">Subconscious</a></li>

<li><a href="Subjective_character_of_experience" title="Subjective character of experience">Subjective character of experience</a></li>

<li><a href="Subjectivity_and_objectivity_(philosophy)" title="Subjectivity and objectivity (philosophy)">Subjectivity and objectivity</a></li>

<li><a href="Unconscious_mind" title="Unconscious mind">Unconscious mind</a></li>

<li><a href="Unconsciousness" title="Unconsciousness">Unconsciousness</a></li>

<li><a href="Upanishads" title="Upanishads">Upanishads</a></li>

<li><a href="Visual_masking" title="Visual masking">Visual masking</a></li>

<li><a href="Consciousness_causes_collapse" title="Consciousness causes collapse">Consciousness causes collapse</a></li>

<li><a href="Yogachara" title="Yogachara">Yogachara</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Works</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><i><a href="A_Universe_of_Consciousness" title="A Universe of Consciousness">A Universe of Consciousness</a></i></li>

<li><a href="Association_for_the_Scientific_Study_of_Consciousness" title="Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness">Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness</a></li>

<li><i><a href="Consciousness_and_Cognition" title="Consciousness and Cognition">Consciousness and Cognition</a></i></li>

<li><i><a href="Consciousness_Explained" title="Consciousness Explained">Consciousness Explained</a></i></li>

<li><i><a href="Cosmic_Consciousness" title="Cosmic Consciousness">Cosmic Consciousness</a></i></li>

<li><i><a href="How_the_Self_Controls_Its_Brain" title="How the Self Controls Its Brain">How the Self Controls Its Brain</a></i></li>

<li><i><a href="Journal_of_Consciousness_Studies" title="Journal of Consciousness Studies">Journal of Consciousness Studies</a></i></li>

<li><a href="Online_Consciousness_Conference" title="Online Consciousness Conference">Online Consciousness Conference</a></li>

<li><i><a href="Psyche_(consciousness_journal)" title="Psyche (consciousness journal)">Psyche</a></i></li>

<li><i><a href="The_Astonishing_Hypothesis" title="The Astonishing Hypothesis">The Astonishing Hypothesis</a></i></li>

<li><i><a href="The_Conscious_Mind" title="The Conscious Mind">The Conscious Mind</a></i></li>

<li><i><a href="The_Emperor's_New_Mind" title="The Emperor's New Mind">The Emperor's New Mind</a></i></li>

<li><a href="The_Science_of_Consciousness" title="The Science of Consciousness">The Science of Consciousness</a></li>

<li><i><a href="Understanding_Consciousness" title="Understanding Consciousness">Understanding Consciousness</a></i></li>

<li><i><a href="Wider_than_the_Sky" title="Wider than the Sky">Wider than the Sky</a></i></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><td class="navbox-abovebelow" colspan="2"><div>

<ul><li><span class="noviewer" typeof="mw:File"><span title="Category"></span></span> Category</li>

<li><span class="noviewer" typeof="mw:File"><span title="Commons page"></span></span> <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Consciousness" class="extiw external" title="commons:Category:Consciousness">Commons</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr></tbody></table></div>

<div class="navbox-styles"></div><div role="navigation" class="navbox" aria-labelledby="Philosophy_of_mind296" style="padding:3px"><table class="nowraplinks hlist mw-collapsible autocollapse navbox-inner" style="border-spacing:0;background:transparent;color:inherit"><tbody><tr><th scope="col" class="navbox-title" colspan="2"><div id="Philosophy_of_mind296" style="font-size:114%;margin:0 4em"><a href="Philosophy_of_mind" title="Philosophy of mind">Philosophy of mind</a></div></th></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Philosophers</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="G._E._M._Anscombe" title="G. E. M. Anscombe">G. E. M. Anscombe</a></li>

<li><a href="Aristotle" title="Aristotle">Aristotle</a></li>

<li><a href="David_Malet_Armstrong" title="David Malet Armstrong">Armstrong</a></li>

<li><a href="Thomas_Aquinas" title="Thomas Aquinas">Thomas Aquinas</a></li>

<li><a href="J._L._Austin" title="J. L. Austin">J. L. Austin</a></li>

<li><a href="Alexander_Bain_(philosopher)" title="Alexander Bain (philosopher)">Alexander Bain</a></li>

<li><a href="George_Berkeley" title="George Berkeley">George Berkeley</a></li>

<li><a href="Henri_Bergson" title="Henri Bergson">Henri Bergson</a></li>

<li><a href="Ned_Block" title="Ned Block">Ned Block</a></li>

<li><a href="Franz_Brentano" title="Franz Brentano">Franz Brentano</a></li>

<li><a href="C._D._Broad" title="C. D. Broad">C. D. Broad</a></li>

<li><a href="Tyler_Burge" title="Tyler Burge">Tyler Burge</a></li>

<li><a href="David_Chalmers" title="David Chalmers">David Chalmers</a></li>

<li><a href="Patricia_Churchland" title="Patricia Churchland">Patricia Churchland</a></li>

<li><a href="Paul_Churchland" title="Paul Churchland">Paul Churchland</a></li>

<li><a href="Andy_Clark" title="Andy Clark">Andy Clark</a></li>

<li><a href="Dharmakirti" title="Dharmakirti">Dharmakirti</a></li>

<li><a href="Donald_Davidson_(philosopher)" title="Donald Davidson (philosopher)">Donald Davidson</a></li>

<li><a href="Daniel_Dennett" title="Daniel Dennett">Daniel Dennett</a></li>

<li><a href="Ren%C3%A9_Descartes" title="René Descartes">René Descartes</a></li>

<li><a href="Fred_Dretske" title="Fred Dretske">Fred Dretske</a></li>

<li><a href="Jerry_Fodor" title="Jerry Fodor">Fodor</a></li>

<li><a href="Alvin_Goldman" title="Alvin Goldman">Goldman</a></li>

<li><a href="Martin_Heidegger" title="Martin Heidegger">Martin Heidegger</a></li>

<li><a href="David_Hume" title="David Hume">David Hume</a></li>

<li><a href="Edmund_Husserl" title="Edmund Husserl">Edmund Husserl</a></li>

<li><a href="William_James" title="William James">William James</a></li>

<li><a href="Frank_Cameron_Jackson" title="Frank Cameron Jackson">Frank Cameron Jackson</a></li>

<li><a href="Immanuel_Kant" title="Immanuel Kant">Immanuel Kant</a></li>

<li><a href="David_Lewis_(philosopher)" title="David Lewis (philosopher)">David Lewis (philosopher)</a></li>

<li><a href="John_Locke" title="John Locke">John Locke</a></li>

<li><a href="Gottfried_Wilhelm_Leibniz" title="Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz">Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz</a></li>

<li><a href="Maurice_Merleau-Ponty" title="Maurice Merleau-Ponty">Maurice Merleau-Ponty</a></li>

<li><a href="Marvin_Minsky" title="Marvin Minsky">Marvin Minsky</a></li>

<li><a href="Thomas_Nagel" title="Thomas Nagel">Thomas Nagel</a></li>

<li><a href="Derek_Parfit" title="Derek Parfit">Derek Parfit</a></li>

<li><a href="Plato" title="Plato">Plato</a></li>

<li><a href="Hilary_Putnam" title="Hilary Putnam">Hilary Putnam</a></li>

<li><a href="Richard_Rorty" title="Richard Rorty">Richard Rorty</a></li>

<li><a href="Gilbert_Ryle" title="Gilbert Ryle">Gilbert Ryle</a></li>

<li><a href="John_Searle" title="John Searle">John Searle</a></li>

<li><a href="Wilfrid_Sellars" title="Wilfrid Sellars">Wilfrid Sellars</a></li>

<li><a href="Baruch_Spinoza" title="Baruch Spinoza">Baruch Spinoza</a></li>

<li><a href="Alan_Turing" title="Alan Turing">Alan Turing</a></li>

<li><a href="Michael_Tye_(philosopher)" title="Michael Tye (philosopher)">Michael Tye</a></li>

<li><a href="Vasubandhu" title="Vasubandhu">Vasubandhu</a></li>

<li><a href="Ludwig_Wittgenstein" title="Ludwig Wittgenstein">Ludwig Wittgenstein</a></li>

<li><a href="Stephen_Yablo" title="Stephen Yablo">Stephen Yablo</a></li>

<li><a href="Zhuang_Zhou" title="Zhuang Zhou">Zhuangzi</a></li>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Theories</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Behaviorism" title="Behaviorism">Behaviorism</a></li>

<li><a href="Biological_naturalism" title="Biological naturalism">Biological naturalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Mind%E2%80%93body_dualism" title="Mind–body dualism">Dualism</a></li>

<li><a href="Eliminative_materialism" title="Eliminative materialism">Eliminative materialism</a></li>

<li><a href="Emergent_materialism" title="Emergent materialism">Emergent materialism</a></li>

<li><a href="Epiphenomenalism" title="Epiphenomenalism">Epiphenomenalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind)" title="Functionalism (philosophy of mind)">Functionalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Interactionism_(philosophy_of_mind)" title="Interactionism (philosophy of mind)">Interactionism</a></li>

<li><a href="Na%C3%AFve_realism" title="Naïve realism">Naïve realism</a>

<ul><li><a href="Neurophenomenology" title="Neurophenomenology">Neurophenomenology</a></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Neutral_monism" title="Neutral monism">Neutral monism</a></li>

<li><a href="New_mysterianism" title="New mysterianism">New mysterianism</a></li>

<li><a href="Nondualism" title="Nondualism">Nondualism</a></li>

<li><a href="Occasionalism" title="Occasionalism">Occasionalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Psychophysical_parallelism" title="Psychophysical parallelism">Parallelism</a></li>

<li><a href="Phenomenalism" title="Phenomenalism">Phenomenalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Phenomenology_(philosophy)" title="Phenomenology (philosophy)">Phenomenology</a></li>

<li><a href="Physicalism" title="Physicalism">Physicalism</a>

<ul><li><a href="Type_physicalism" title="Type physicalism">Type physicalism</a></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Property_dualism" title="Property dualism">Property dualism</a></li>

<li><a href="Mental_representation" title="Mental representation">Representational</a></li>

<li><a href="Solipsism" title="Solipsism">Solipsism</a></li>

<li><a href="Substance_dualism" class="mw-redirect" title="Substance dualism">Substance dualism</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Concepts</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Abstract_and_concrete" title="Abstract and concrete">Abstract object</a></li>

<li><a href="Animal_machine" title="Animal machine">Animal machine</a></li>

<li><a href="Chinese_room" title="Chinese room">Chinese room</a></li>

<li><a href="Creativity" title="Creativity">Creativity</a></li>

<li><a href="Cognition" title="Cognition">Cognition</a></li>

<li><a href="Cognitive_closure_(philosophy)" title="Cognitive closure (philosophy)">Cognitive closure</a></li>

<li><a href="Concept" title="Concept">Concept</a></li>

<li><a href="Consciousness" title="Consciousness">Consciousness</a></li>

<li><a href="Hard_problem_of_consciousness" title="Hard problem of consciousness">Hard problem of consciousness</a></li>

<li><a href="Hypostatic_abstraction" title="Hypostatic abstraction">Hypostatic abstraction</a></li>

<li><a href="Identity_(philosophy)" title="Identity (philosophy)">Identity</a></li>

<li><a href="Intelligence" title="Intelligence">Intelligence</a>

<ul><li><a href="Artificial_intelligence" title="Artificial intelligence">Artificial</a></li>

<li><a href="Human_intelligence" title="Human intelligence">Human</a></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Intentionality" title="Intentionality">Intentionality</a></li>

<li><a href="Introspection" title="Introspection">Introspection</a></li>

<li><a href="Intuition" title="Intuition">Intuition</a></li>

<li><a href="Language_of_thought_hypothesis" title="Language of thought hypothesis">Language of thought</a></li>

<li><a href="Mental_event" title="Mental event">Mental event</a></li>

<li><a href="Mental_image" title="Mental image">Mental image</a></li>

<li>Mental process</li>

<li><a href="Mental_state" title="Mental state">Mental property</a></li>

<li><a href="Mental_representation" title="Mental representation">Mental representation</a></li>

<li><a href="Problem_of_other_minds" title="Problem of other minds">Problem of other minds</a></li>

<li><a href="Propositional_attitude" title="Propositional attitude">Propositional attitude</a></li>

<li><a href="Qualia" title="Qualia">Qualia</a></li>

<li><a href="Tabula_rasa" title="Tabula rasa">Tabula rasa</a></li>

<li><a href="Understanding" title="Understanding">Understanding</a></li>

<li><a href="Philosophical_zombie" title="Philosophical zombie">Zombie</a></li></ul>

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<ul><li><a href="Metaphysics" title="Metaphysics">Metaphysics</a></li>

<li><a href="Philosophy_of_artificial_intelligence" title="Philosophy of artificial intelligence">Philosophy of artificial intelligence</a> / <a href="Philosophy_of_information" title="Philosophy of information">information</a> / <a href="Philosophy_of_perception" title="Philosophy of perception">perception</a> / <a href="Philosophy_of_self" title="Philosophy of self">self</a></li></ul>

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<ul><li>Category</li>

<li>Philosophers category</li>

<li>Project</li>

<li>Task Force</li></ul>

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